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I. INTRODUCTIONA PPROXIMATELY 275,000 active businesses are incorporated
under the main enabling provisions of the Texas Business Corpora-
tion Act [TBCA].I Despite the availability of special close corpora-
tion provisions since 1973, virtually all closely-held corporations were
incorporated under the main incorporation provisions of the TBCA prior to
1981. Since the 1981 enactment of revisions to the special close corporation
provisions of the TBCA, now collectively referred to as the Texas Close Cor-
poration Law [TCCL], 2 an increasing number of closely-held corporations
are availing themselves of the TCCL. In any event, the vast majority of
corporations incorporated in Texas under both the main TBCA provisions
and the TCCL are closely-held corporations. 3 Consequently, although rep-
resenting the publicly-held corporation may be glamorous, the realities of
business life and legal practice indicate that most practicing lawyers in
Texas, both in large and small firms, encounter the problems of the closely-
held corporation and its owners on a frequent basis. 4
This Article addresses the fundamental legal problems of adjusting and
protecting shareholder interests in the closely-held corporation. After dis-
cussing certain introductory matters and the basic corporate documentation
affecting shareholders, this Article focuses on three fundamental problems of
owners in a closely-held corporation and the various statutory and contrac-
tual techniques for addressing those problems. The first fundamental prob-
lem involves allocation and maintenance of equity control. Second, the
Article examines the allocation and maintenance of "managerial" control on
1. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 3.01-.06 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1985) [hereinafter
cited as TBCA]. This figure represents the estimated number of domestic incorporated busi-
nesses as of March 1, 1985, as recorded in the Office of the Secretary of the State of Texas.
2. TBCA arts. 12.01-.03, 12.11-.14, 12.21-.23, 12.31-.39, 12.51-.54 (Vernon Supp. 1985)
[hereinafter cited as TCCL]. The TCCL was enacted by an Act relating to close corporations,
ch. 818, 1981 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3102 (Vernon), repealing the sections of the TBCA previ-
ously governing close corporations. See TBCA arts. 2.30-1 to -5 (Vernon 1980), repealed by an
Act relating to close corporations, ch. 818, § 9, 1981 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3118 (Vernon).
3. A closely-held corporation is a non-publicly-held corporate enterprise owned by a
small group of persons. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 281 (4th ed. 1980). Ac-
cording to the Texas State Securities Board, during the three-month period from September 1,
1984, through November 30, 1984, only 29 Texas corporations registered securities for public
offering. Several of these registrations represented secondary securities offerings by already-
public Texas corporations. Clearly, relatively few Texas corporations are publicly-held.
4. See generally D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING ch. 1, § 3, at 50-67 (1966) (discuss-
ing peculiarities of close corporations and their advantages over partnerships); I F. O'NEAL,
CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1.02-.09 (2d ed. 1971 & Supp. 1984) (dis-
cussing attributes of close corporations and the distinctive business objectives that the close
corporation form facilitates); W. PAINTER, CORPORATE AND TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY
HELD CORPORATIONS ch. 2 (1981) (discussing tax consequences and benefits of forming close
corporations).
1985]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39
both a shareholder and management level. Finally, the Article analyzes ef-
fective dispute resolution.
II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Models of Corporate Governance
The legal model of corporate governance presented by state corporation
codes is skeletal. 5 These codes grant shareholders: (1) the right to manage
the corporation through the election and removal of directors;6 (2) the right
to participate in dividend distributions at the reasonable discretion of the
board of directors; 7 (3) the right to vote, often regardless of class, on certain
fundamental corporate changes;8 and (4) the right to share in the net corpo-
rate assets upon dissolution. 9 The directors, on the other hand, generally
have the duty to manage the corporation.' 0 Little is said under the TBCA
about the role of corporate officers, " who operate the corporation on a day-
to-day basis. 12 The TBCA and most other state corporation codes do not
address such fundamental problems of corporate governance as the legal
standards respecting the duties and performance of the directors, officers,
shareholders, and other controlling persons, and the accountability of the
relationship between these various corporate actors in their respective capac-
ities.13 The corporation codes have left these glaring gaps to the wisdom of
the courts.
5. State corporation laws generally provide the legal framework for: (1) the procedure
for incorporation, see, e.g., TBCA arts. 3.01-.06 (Vernon 1980); (2) the powers of the corpora-
tion as a separate legal entity, see, e.g., TBCA arts. 2.02, 2.02-1, 2.03 (Vernon 1980 & Supp.
1985); (3) the rights and obligations of officers, directors, and shareholders, see, e.g., TBCA
arts. 2.21, 2.41-.43 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1985); and (4) the basic requirements for lawfully
conducting business within the state, whether or not a business is incorporated in that state,
see, e.g., TBCA arts. 2.05-.11 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1985).
6. See, e.g., TBCA art. 2.32 (Vernon 1980); 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 283-288 (rev. perm. ed. 1982); D. HERWITZ, supra note 4, at
29.
7. See, e.g., TBCA art. 2.38 (Vernon 1980).
8. See, e.g., TBCA art. 5.03 (Vernon 1980); see also D. HERWITZ, supra note 4, at 29
(discussing residual power of shareholders in matters involving fundamental corporate
changes).
9. See, e.g., TBCA art. 6.04, § A(3) (Vernon 1980).
10. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1979); W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 3,
at 118; 2 W. FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 505; D. HERWITZ, supra note 4, at 29. TBCA art.
2.31, § A (Vernon 1980) merely states that the "business and affairs of a corporation shall be
managed by a board of directors." The Delaware General Corporation Law somewhat more
elaborately states that the "business and affairs of every corporation ... shall be managed by
or under the direction of a board of directors .. " DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983).
11. TBCA art. 2.42, § A (Vernon 1980) defines the officers of a corporation as "a presi-
dent, one or more vice-presidents as may be prescribed by the bylaws, a secretary, .. .a
treasurer, [and any] other officers and assistant officers and agents as may be deemed neces-
sary." The TBCA allows one person to hold two or more offices simultaneously. TBCA art.
2.42, § A (Vernon 1980).
12. The TBCA merely provides that officers "shall have such authority and perform such
duties in the management of the corporation as may be provided in the bylaws, or as may be
determined by resolution of the board of directors not inconsistent with the bylaws." TBCA
art. 2.42, § B (Vernon 1980).
13. See, e.g., W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 381 ("The directors' duties are,
in the main, duties owed to the corporate entity as such rather than to the shareholders or
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In terms of real models of corporate governance, corporations clearly dif-
fer from one corporate entity to the other by virtue of their size, nature,
shareholder expectations, and management structure. State corporation
codes generally fail to address these differences. 14 I suggest, however, that
despite the skeletal treatment of corporate interests within these state corpo-
ration codes, and notwithstanding the enactment in certain states of special
provisions regarding the close corporation, the traditional legal model of
governance that these codes present, when considered in conjunction with
the permissible charter and contractual techniques available for forming,
structuring, and managing a corporation, meets most of the fundamental
governance needs of the closely-held corporation.
B. Certain Basic Problems of the Closely-Held Corporation
The following factors generally characterize a closely-held corporation: 15
(1) a small number of shareholders; (2) lack of a public trading market for
the corporation's stock; (3) a close relation between management and at least
the principal shareholders; (4) a personal relationship among all or some of
the shareholders; (5) shareholder knowledge about the corporation;
(6) shareholder desire to exert some control over the corporate voting pro-
cess; and (7) an informality in day-to-day management of the corporation. 16
Also, due to the informality and personal relationships often existing within
the close corporation, most legal arrangements between the various corpo-
rate actors will, unfortunately, be oral. 17 Owners and prospective owners of
a closely-held corporation consequently face the following problems.
1. Allocation and Maintenance of Equity Interests. One of the crucial con-
siderations in incorporation planning is the proper allocation, by charter
documents, contracts, and other legal devices, of ownership interests in the
closely-held corporation. Complexities include the type of stock that the
corporation will issue, the means by which an owner may increase stock
ownership in specific situations, and the overall preservation of desired own-
ership interests during the life of the corporation.' 8
creditors individually, but they are in many, perhaps in most cases, enforced on behalf of the
corporation in suits instituted by individual shareholders.").
14. This inadequacy of the state codes is displayed most graphically in the context of the
public corporation, a subject that is without the purview of this Article. See generally M.
EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODERN CORPORATION (1977).
15. The TCCL defines a close corporation as a domestic corporation, formed under the
ordinary incorporation provisions of TBCA arts. 3.01-.06, that has elected close corporation
status. TCCL art. 12.02 (Vernon Supp. 1985). One may elect close corporation status merely
by including the following statement in the articles of incorporation: "This corporation is a
close corporation." TCCL art. 12.11 (Vernon Supp. 1985); see Lebowitz, How to Use the Flex-
ibility Afforded by the Close Corporation in Texas, in TEXAS BAR ASSOCIATION ADVANCED
CORPORATION SEMINAR (1984).
16. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975).
17. See 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 4, § 2.23, at 92.
18. See generally D. HERWITZ, supra note 4, ch. 1, § 3 (1966) (discussing alternative
methods of corporate capitalization and their impact on equity interests and control).
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2. Allocation and Maintenance of "Managerial" Control. "Managerial"
control may extend to the voting rights of shareholders and to the rights of
the day-to-day corporate managers. Ownership ordinarily imparts an ele-
ment of voting control over the corporation. This control extends to the
election of directors and to the decision-making process that governs funda-
mental corporate matters and changes. An owner in a corporation, how-
ever, may have inferior or unequal voting rights, contractually restricted
voting rights, or nonvoting stock and, therefore, no voting rights. Voting
rights usually concern the selection of the directors and the effectuation of
major changes within the corporation. The owner's voting rights normally
may not legally entail managerial control over the day-to-day operations of
the corporation. In practice, however, shareholder involvement in manage-
ment of closely-held corporations varies. Some owners participate in day-to-
day management of the corporation as officers or employees, whereas other
owners take passive positions. Moreover, as the corporation matures and
grows, a manager often may not have a significant ownership interest in the
corporation, but he may exercise considerable control over corporate opera-
tions. This latter situation raises the corporate planning problem of simulta-
neously protecting the legitimate interests of nonowner managers and
nonmanaging owners. The important practical problems involved in allocat-
ing and maintaining "managerial" control within the closely-held corpora-
tion include: (1) ensuring that shares are not transferred to outsiders who
might be difficult to work with or have interests opposed to those of the
other shareholders; (2) ensuring that each shareholder can elect at least one,
and possibly more than one, director; (3) ensuring that shareholders may
vote their shares together to elect several directors and thereby control the
board; (4) ensuring that shareholder controls exist over certain director ac-
tions; and (5) ensuring that the expectations of the day-to-day managers are
met. 19
3. Dispute Resolution. Continuing existence and economic growth are key
objectives in most large and small corporations. With respect to closely-held
corporations, however, the possibilities for unanticipated events such as
death of a "key" owner 20 or divisive disputes among owners or between
owners and managers are great. Failure to make provision for such events
or to resolve disputes at an early stage can lead to costly litigation, severe
disruption of corporate business, and even liquidation of the corporation.
Thus, providing a proper legal framework for the resolution of corporate
disputes is essential to protecting and preserving shareholder interests and
expectations. 2 1
19. See 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 4, § 2.23; W. PAINTER, supra note 4, § 1.7.
20. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 3, ch. 5, § I & n.2 (discussing difference
between legal perpetuity of the close corporation and actual perpetuity of the close corpora-
tion; when the success of the close corporation depends heavily upon the efforts of a single
person, his death or retirement may destroy the business even though the corporation contin-
ues to exist legally in perpetuity).
21. See W. PAINTER, supra note 4, § 1.4, at 14 (discussing dangers of deadlock in disputes
among shareholders or directors).
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4. Other Related Problems. There are a number of problems related to the
three fundamental problems referred to above that may need to be addressed
when planning for the fundamental problems. For example, within a corpo-
rate organization, an owner's liability ordinarily extends only to his equity in
the corporation. If an owner is also a manager, however, the owner may be
exposed to liabilities to third parties and government authorities beyond his
equity interest. This exposure raises questions of statutory22 or contractual
corporate indemnification.
A corporation generates profits or losses through its operations. Through
corporate planning, these profits and losses are allocated among the owners,
and the allocation need not be in proportion to the owners' equity interests.
For example, preferred stockholders may have priority in payments, whereas
common stockholders may have a greater residual interest in profits. More-
over, a corporation may distribute profits to owners through means other
than dividends, such as through a reasonable salary to an owner/manager.
These nondividend distributions, however, must comply with various legal
restrictions imposed by statutory provisions on legal capital and by the fed-
eral tax laws.2 3
One of the most elusive, but most fundamental, concepts of corporate or-
ganization is valuation. Financial accounting statements indicate a book
value of the corporation's assets, but this valuation may not be relevant for
corporate planning purposes. For example, the book value of the corporate
assets may be based largely on historical costs rather than actual replace-
ment value. Moreover, the book value of a going concern may be less rele-
vant in determining the value of the concern than the corporation's ability to
generate earnings on a consistent and continuous basis. On the other hand,
if the corporation encounters financial trouble and liquidates, the liquidation
valuation may be considerably less than the book value. 24 Accordingly, own-
ers and others having an economic interest in a corporation often find it very
difficult to evaluate the worth of the enterprise. This dilemma may compli-
cate the allocation of ownership and managerial interests within the corpora-
tion. The valuation issue may also provide a continuing basis for internal
dispute. When such disputes arise, the question of valuation may be trans-
ferred to an arbitration forum, to a civil court of law, or, in the case of
financially troubled corporations, to a bankruptcy court.25
22. See TBCA arts. 2.02, § A(16), 2.02-1 (Vernon Supp. 1985); MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
ACT § 5 (1979).
23. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE pt. III (2d ed. 1979).
24. See generally J. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937); 0. BOWLIN, J. MAR-
TIN & D. ScoTr, GUIDE TO FINANCIAL ANALYSIS (1980); V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN,
supra note 23, pt I; 1 A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 275-307 (5th
ed. 1953); P. HUNT, C. WILLIAMS & G. DONALDSON, BASIC BUSINESS FINANCE 548-59 (4th
ed. 1971) (discussing and comparing methods of valuation).
25. For two interesting judicial approaches to the corporate valuation problem, see Wein-
berger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (in determining stock value, court may
consider all relevant factors recognized in the financial community); Piemonte v. New Boston
Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 387 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 n.3 (1979) (upholding trial court's valu-
ation of corporate stock based upon an arbitrarily weighted average of the corporate stock's
market value, the business's earnings value as a going concern, and the corporation's net asset
19851
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C. Available Contractual Solutions
One can address the above fundamental problems in planning for the
closely-held corporation through provisions in charter documents or
through ancillary contractual arrangements. This Article discusses the fol-
lowing selective techniques for dealing with these problems: (1) capitaliza-
tion and classification of shares; (2) preemptive rights; (3) stock transfer
restrictions; (4) irrevocable proxies; (5) voting trusts; (6) shareholder pooling
arrangements concerning election of directors and other matters; (7) cumu-
lative voting; (8) higher quorum and voting requirements; (9) management
contracts; (10) buy-sell arrangements and other special contractual or char-
ter arrangements for resolving disputes; (11) arbitration; and (12) statutory
dissolution and receivership provisions.
D. Methodology of Approach
My thesis is that the good business attorney should start with the simplest
approach and add sophistication only when necessary. When organizing a
closely-held business, the attorney should ascertain first whether compelling
reasons exist to incorporate the business; he should not assume incorpora-
tion is the best alternative. 2 6 If the attorney chooses the corporate form, he
will often find that basic TBCA provisions or TCCL provisions, combined
with appropriate drafting of the charter documents, adequately address the
legitimate concerns of the owner/client.
Complexities, such as lengthy and convoluted shareholder contracts, often
add more confusion than certainty and thereby imperil the objective of
achieving an effective and enforceable realization of the owners' interests
with a minimum of dispute. Notwithstanding the complexities, sophisti-
cated agreements, such as subscription agreements, shareholder pooling ar-
rangements, voting trusts, and buy-sell arrangements, may become
necessary. Thus, when organizing a closely-held corporation the attorney
may have to consider and interrelate: (1) the basic statutory provisions of
the TBCA and, if chosen, the TCCL; (2) the basic shareholder "contracts,"
such as articles of incorporation, bylaws, organizational minutes, and stock
certificates; and (3) the more sophisticated shareholder agreements.
In addition to starting from the simplest base of the corporation code and
the charter documents, one useful approach to structuring a closely-held
corporation and drafting the related documents is to scrutinize the situation
value); see also Hardee, The Valuation of a Closely-Held Business, 5 & 6 ALI-ABA COURSE
MAT'LS J. pt. I, June 1981, at 35; pt. II, Aug. 1981, at 79; pt. III, Oct. 1981, at 83.
26. See, e.g., F. O'NEAL, supra note 4, § 2.04; W. PAINTER, supra note 4, § 1.5; Hazen,
The Decision to Incorporate, 58 NEB. L. REV. 627, 628 (1979). The major advantages of not
incorporating a closely-held business and operating under the sole proprietorship or partner-
ship form include: (1) passthrough of early operating losses and related tax deductions from
the business directly to the owner, see I.R.C. § 165 (1982); (2) avoidance of the double taxation
of distributed corporate profits, see id. § 11 (net profit of corporation taxed at corporate tax
rates); id. § 61(a)(7) (dividends distributed to shareholders included in gross income); and
(3) avoidance of the formalities of incorporation, such as attending organizational meetings,




from the perspective of a disgruntled party who would attack the validity of
the structure and documents. A review of the case law indicates that such
attacks generally involve one or more of the following claims: (1) noncom-
pliance with statutory requirements; 27 (2) impairment of contractual rights
or breach of contractual obligations; 28 (3) unreasonable alienation of funda-
mental shareholder property rights;29 and (4) breach of fiduciary duties, in-
cluding unfairness and overreaching by those in control of the corporation.
30
These four prongs of attack, in addition to tax considerations, 31 form the
boundaries within which most corporate planning for the closely-held corpo-
ration must occur.
E. Comment on the TCCL
The basic privilege that a close corporation election under the TCCL pro-
vides is an ability to operate under a shareholders agreement with the free-
dom of a partnership, but without the concern of personal or unlimited
liability.32 The TCCL also sets forth the governing procedure in a close
corporation, 33 the requisites of the shareholders agreement, 34 and the means
for dispute resolution. 35 Even though the TCCL governs close corporations,
however, all other provisions of the TBCA not inconsistent with the TCCL
27. See Beach v. McKay, 108 Tex. 224, 226, 191 S.W. 557, 558 (1917).
28. Compare Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del.
Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441, 447 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (upholding shareholder agreements that contract
away shareholders' voting rights), with Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635, 197 S.W. 376,
382 (1917) ("Although a stockholder may vote as he pleases, public policy forbids the enforce-
ment of a contract by which a stockholder undertakes to bargain away his right to vote for
directors according to his best judgment, and in the interest of the corporation. He has no
right to disable himself by contract from performing this duty.").
29. See Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 541, 141 N.E.2d 812, 815, 161
N.Y.S.2d 418, 422, (1957) (plaintiff, deceased shareholder's representative, challenged corpo-
ration's contractual right of first refusal on decedent's shares as an unreasonable restraint on
alienation).
30. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975).
31. See W. PAINTER, supra note 4, § 2.1.
32. For an excellent discussion of the Texas Close Corporation Law, see Lebowitz, supra
note 15. For a general background discussion of the TCCL, see Blunk, Analyzing Texas Arti-
cles of Incorporation: Is the Statutory Close Corporation Format Viable?, 34 Sw. L.J. 942
(1980). As a matter of philosophical bent, I remain skeptical of the need for special close
corporation statutes. During the past thirty years an enormous expenditure of energy and
talent has produced a marginal return in the area of close corporation statutes. See Fessler,
The Fate of Closely Held Business Associations. The Debatable Wisdom of "Incorporation," 13
U. CAL. DAVis L. REV. 473, 473-75 (1980); Roseberry, Traditional Corporate Concepts in
Light of Demands for Elastic Norms for the Family or Closely Held Corporation, 5 J. CORP. L.
455, 457 (1980). Nevertheless, an attorney has a duty to advise the client of the existence of
close corporation provisions, and these special statutory provisions may offer a distinct advan-
tage in at least three situations: (1) in a one- or two-person corporation; (2) when the desired
corporate structure requires agreements that courts traditionally have held unenforceable as
against public policy; and (3) when the client either cannot or will not maintain the corporate
formalitites required under the general provisions of the TBCA. This Article will concentrate
on the main body of the TBCA and traditional corporate control and dispute resolution mech-
anisms, although cross-references to the TCCL will be made.
33. TCCL art. 12.31 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
34. TCCL arts. 12.32-.36 (Vernon Supp. 1985).




apply to a close corporation.3 6
The TCCL offers both advantages and limitations to persons planning for
the small corporation. 37 The advantages of the TCCL are numerous. First,
the TCCL recognizes that the relationship among owners of a close corpora-
tion may resemble a partnership. 38  Second, the TCCL requires few of the
traditional corporate formalities. 39 Third, participants in a close corporation
enjoy relative autonomy under the TCCL to achieve desirable contractual
arrangements. 4° Fourth, the TCCL offers several means for dispute resolu-
tion.4' Fifth, broad shareholder agreements that might otherwise be subject
to attack may be more easily enforced under the TCCL.42 Finally, the TCCL
provides limited statutory relief to close corporation owners from alter ego
attacks.
4 3
Despite these advantages, several limitations remain in the TCCL. First,
election of close corporation status under the TCCL still requires drafting
specific provisions to the articles of incorporation, share restriction provi-
sions, and often a shareholders' agreement. Second, although the TCCL
provides greater flexibility in certain areas, substantially all of the ends that
can be attained under the TCCL can also be accomplished under the general
provisions of the TBCA in conjunction with the various techniques of con-
trol previously discussed. Third, notwithstanding the statutory relief avail-
able under TBCA article 12.37, section F, the encouragement of corporate
informality under the TCCL places the close corporation on the edge of the
alter ego doctrine. 44 Fourth, the advantages of the TCCL are provisional
36. TCCL art. 12.03 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
37. See generally Lebowitz, supra note 15; Lebowitz, Texas Close Corporation Law, 44
TEX. B.J. 51, 51-52 (1981).
38. TCCL art. 12.37, § F (Vernon Supp. 1985) recognizes that shareholders in a close
corporation frequently treat themselves as partners and the business entity as a partnership.
Article 12.37, § F specifically states that such treatment by the shareholders or the sharehold-
ers' failure to observe other corporate formalities shall not defeat the corporation's status as a
close corporation.
39. TCCL art. 12.37, § F (Vernon Supp. 1985).
40. TCCL art. 12.38 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
41. TCCL arts. 12.51-.54 (Vernon Supp. 1985). The TCCL dispute resolution provisions
pay the highest respect to the will of the shareholders at the time of the signing of the share-
holders' agreement, while balancing the need of the corporation to continue as a viable entity
without impediments such as deadlock. TCCL arts. 12.52, § A(2) & 12.53 (Vernon Supp.
1985) empower a competent court to appoint a provisional director, upon a showing of dead-
lock among voting directors, to act as an impartial vote to break the deadlock. TCCL art.
12.52, § A(5) & § B (Vernon Supp. 1985) provides for dissolution of the close corporation and
the appointment of a receiver to conduct liquidation as a remedy of last resort. These and
other court-imposed remedies are unavailable, however, unless the complaining shareholder
has first exhausted all nonjudicial remedies provided in the shareholder agreement. TCCL art.
12.51, § E (Vernon Supp. 1985).
42. TCCL art. 12.35 (Vernon Supp. 1985). The TCCL provides that shareholder agree-
ments are valid and enforceable, notwithstanding any provision that restricts the discretion or
powers of the directors or managers. Texas courts traditionally have held agreements contain-
ing such provisions void and unenforceable. See Burnett v. Word, Inc., 412 S.W.2d 792, 795
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967, writ dism'd by agr.).
43. TCCL art. 12.37, § E (Vernon Supp. 1985).
44. See Roylex, Inc. v. Langson Bros. Constr. Co., 585 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.), for a discussion of Texas's application of the
alter ego doctrine. I believe that the alter ego doctrine remains a relevant concern for the close
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because termination of closely-held status reverts the corporation and any
shareholder agreements into the purview of the general corporation laws.45
Fifth, the TCCL does not specifically address the protection of minority in-
terests, which is the fundamental problem in close corporations. Finally,
unlike the general provisions of the TBCA, the TCCL does not have a body
of case law to interpret its special provisions and thereby guide
practitioners. 46
F. Comment on Fiduciary and Professional Responsibilities
Planning for the closely-held corporation raises several very difficult ques-
tions concerning the fiduciary duties of the various corporate actors and the
professional responsibility of the corporate attorney. First, since a closely-
held corporation is akin to a partnership, 47 the strict fiduciary duties existing
between partners should also exist between the actors within a closely-held
corporation. 48 Public policy considerations cast doubt upon the ability of
parties contractually to diminish these fiduciary duties within a closely-held
corporation. 49 Second, possession of corporate control may itself raise spe-
cial fiduciary responsibilities.50 Third, an attorney who structures a close
corporation may confront ethical problems with respect to conflict of inter-
est and overreaching. For example, in a close corporation the attorney often
represents all of the interested parties. On the other hand, if the attorney
corporation because informality can often lead to commingling of funds and other practices
that suggest that the corporate entity is a mere instrumentality or conduit of its owners.
45. TCCL art. 12.23, § A (Vernon Supp. 1985).
46. Prior to the 1981 enactment of the TCCL, many practitioners were hesitant to use the
TBCA close corporation provisions, primarily because of: (1) the confusion surrounding the
1973 and 1975 TBCA amendments; (2) the unknown flirtation with the alter ego doctrine;
(3) the marginal practical advantages for using the special close corporation form; and (4) the
absence of case law on the subject. With the 1981 amendments, practitioners may be more
open to use the special close corporation status.
47. The TCCL expressly permits such a corporation to be treated effectively as a partner-
ship. TCCL art. 12.37, § F (Vernon Supp. 1985).
48. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (1975);
Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539 (1949); Winter, State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 277 (1977); Comment,
Exploitation Among Close Corporation Shareholders: A Philosophical Change and Its Conse-
quences, 16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 747, 751-52 (1981). See generally F. O'NEAL,
"SQUEEZE OUTS" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 7.14 (1975) (shareholders in closely-held
corporation often intend to run the corporation as a partnership).
49. For a discussion of this issue in the context of bankruptcy, see In re Reading Co., 711
F.2d 509, 517-20 (3d Cir. 1983).
50. Commentators have proposed that corporate control imposes a fiduciary duty based
on any one of the following theories: (1) control constitutes a corporate asset; (2) the exercise
of control is a corporate action; (3) the position of controlling shareholder resembles that of a
strict trustee; and (4) to impose such a duty on a controlling shareholder is fundamentally fair.
See O'Neal, Hayes, Hazen & Santoni, Symposium: Sale of Control, 4 J. CORP. L. 239, 282-83
(1979); Comment, Should Texas Courts Impose a Fiduciary Duty on Controlling Shareholders
in the Use, Sale and Transfer of Their Shares?, 3 TEX. TECH L. REV. 353, 358 (1972); cf
Thompson v. Hambrick, 508 S.W.2d 949, 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ refrd n.r.e.)
(majority shareholder, who was paid substantial premium for his shares due to amount of
control, under no obligation to minority shareholders or corporation to account for such prof-
its so long as majority shareholder acts in good faith and has no reason to suspect purchaser
will loot the corporation).
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only represents the controlling parties, the minority party often will not be
represented by independent counsel. Another example involves offers by the
corporation and its promoter to reimburse the attorney for his services
through the issuance of stock in the corporation. This offer presents a poten-
tially unacceptable conflict of interest. Finally, planning for small corpora-
tions can be more complex than planning for large corporations. The small
corporation client, however, cannot always afford the legal fees involved in
sophisticated corporate planning. Consequently, the attorney may face a
choice between providing a service that the client can afford and providing
competent representation.5 1
III. BASIC DOCUMENTATION
A. Preincorporation Agreements and Subscription Agreements
Typically, closely-held corporations are organized and incorporated based
on a business bargain among the prospective participants that is never re-
duced to a written preincorporation agreement. Instead, the parties proceed
to draft and execute the articles of incorporation or charter and bylaws, hold
the organizational meeting of the incorporators and directors, and deliver
the required money and property to the corporation within a short time. If
the business bargain on which the incorporation effort proceeds is merely a
vague understanding, however, the participants may not fully realize or ap-
preciate the ramifications of the deal. In these circumstances a preincorpo-
ration agreement can clarify and memorialize the understanding between the
parties before resources are irrevocably committed.
Preincorporation agreements are most useful in the following situations:
(1) when organization of the corporation will require a considerable amount
of time; (2) when the business bargain contemplates extensive financial com-
mitments prior to actual incorporation; (3) when the participants desire to
bind one or more of their number to commitments for future financing; and
(4) when the business bargain involves a promise to one or more of the par-
ticipants of future employment in the corporation. After the corporation is
organized, the corporation should formally approve and adopt the preincor-
poration agreement, especially if the agreement purports to obligate the cor-
poration in any way. 5 2 Because scant Texas law exists on preincorporation
agreements, however, the attorney may have to consult other jurisdictions to
find assistance on the subject.5 3
A preincorporation subscription agreement is a contract in which a pro-
spective investor promises the promoter to purchase a specified number of
unissued shares of the to-be-formed corporation at a specified price and pur-
suant to specified terms. A preincorporation subscription agreement is use-
ful, but not always necessary, to secure the initial venture capital for the new
51. See Olson, Adequate Representation of Multiple Clients During the Formation of a
Business, 1979 LEGAL MALP. REV. 1.
52. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 4, § 2.23.
53. See 19 R. HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS ch. 10 (Texas Practice 1973 &
Supp. 1982); Comment, Preincorporation Agreements, 11 Sw. L.J. 509 (1957).
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corporation. 54 A subscription agreement need not be in writing to constitute
a formal contract. As a practical matter, however, use of a written agree-
ment will preserve the expectations of the parties and avoid future disputes
and litigation. Furthermore, certain corporation codes require a written
agreement for the subscription to be legally enforceable. 55 Under Texas law,
a subscription must be in writing to fall within the TBCA provisions dealing
with subscription agreements. 56
The common law does not clearly indicate whether a preincorporation
subscription agreement is a continuing offer to the prospective corporation
and, therefore, revocable prior to incorporation and effective corporate ac-
tion, or whether the agreement is irrevocable from the date of subscription.
57
Most modern corporation codes, including the TBCA, provide that a sub-
scription is irrevocable for six months unless the agreement provides other-
wise or all subscribers consent to revocation of the subscription.
58
Most corporation codes, including the TBCA, also provide that a sub-
scription for shares must be paid in full at the time of subscription or in such
installments as the board of directors determines unless the agreement states
otherwise. Failure to pay an installment provides the corporation with the
same remedies available for collecting any other debt due to the corpora-
tion.59 The subscribed shares cannot be issued, however, until the corpora-
tion comes into legal existence and normally not until the corporation has
received the full amount of the consideration for such shares. 60 Some states
permit the issuance of partly paid shares, subject to call for the remainder of
the consideration. Some of these states even permit the issuance of partly
paid shares as fully paid and nonassessable if the partial consideration at
least equals the minimum stated capital legally attributable to the shares and
if the remaining consideration is subject to a binding obligation to pay.6 1
A major legal consideration surrounding the subscription process is that
the subscription agreement constitutes a security under federal and most
54. See generally Winton, Private Corporate Stock Subscription Agreements, 33 S. CAL. L.
REV. 388 (1960) (discussing various rationales for and benefits of preincorporation subscrip-
tion agreements).
55. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 166 (1983).
56. Jatoi v. Park Center, Inc., 616 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981,
writ ref d n.r.e.). TBCA art. 1.02, § A(5) (Vernon 1980) states: "'Subscription' means a
memorandum in writing, executed before or after incorporation, wherein an offer is made to
purchase and pay for a specified number of theretofore unissued shares of a corporation."
57. Compare Collins v. Morgan Grain Co., 16 F.2d 253, 254 (9th Cir. 1926) (subscription
to purchase stock does not become an enforceable contract until the proposed corporation is
organized, and the subscriber may revoke his offer), with Coleman Hotel Co. v. Crawford, 3
S.W.2d 1109, 1109-10 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, opinion adopted) (subscription agreement
constitutes a binding contract by the subscribers to become stockholders upon fulfillment of
condition that corporation be formed, and as such is irrevocable from the date of subscription
absent unanimous consent of other subscribers).
58. TBCA art. 2.14, § A (Vernon 1980); see Cataldo, Conditions in Subscriptions for
Shares, 43 VA. L. REV. 353, 360-65 (1957).
59. TBCA art. 2.14, § D (Vernon 1980).
60. TBCA art. 2.16 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1985).
61. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 152-156 (1983).
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state securities laws. 62 Consequently, the subscription agreement, as well as
the underlying security, are subject to the general registration requirements
of these laws unless an exemption from registration can be shown. 63 Ac-
cordingly, the subscription process is practical only for transactions in which
an exemption form registration is available. Even if an exemption is avail-
able, the promoter and others facilitating the process will remain subject to
general antifraud liability under the securities laws. 6 4
B. Other Preincorporation Arrangements
In addition to soliciting venture capital to finance the corporation, a pro-
moter will often arrange for the necessary physical facilities, equipment, and
personnel to commence business and engage the necessary legal and ac-
counting services to complete the incorporation. These arrangements re-
quire the promoter to enter into a series of formal and informal contracts
prior to actual incorporation. The resulting contracts pose legal concerns
for the promoter, who wants to avoid personal liability, for the other con-
tracting party, who may not know the circumstances, and for the proposed
corporation, which may ultimately become obligated under the contracts.
In a post-incorporation situation many of these problems would be ad-
dressed under traditional agency principles. In a yet-to-be-formed corpora-
tion, however, an agency relationship between the promoter and the non-
existent corporation is impossible.65
Most problems with promoter contracts will arise either: (1) when the
contract is executed in the name of the yet-to-be-formed corporation; or
(2) when the contract indicates that the corporation has not yet been
formed.6 6 First, when the contract is entered into in the name of the yet-to-
be-formed corporation, the promoter creates the appearance in his dealings
with the third party that the corporation is in existence. Although this rule
often produces a windfall for the third party who believes he or she was
dealing with a corporate entity, the general rule is that, absent a properly
drafted agreement reflecting the contrary, the promoter is personally liable
on such contracts. This result is based either on the theory of misrepresenta-
tion by the promoter 67 or on the theory that the promoter is the principal. 68
If the corporation comes into being and adopts the contract, however, the
promoter may argue that any misrepresentation has been corrected; and,
62. Securities Act of 1933, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982) (current version); e.g., Texas
Securities Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4, § A (Vernon 1964). See generally IA
W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 188.1 (rev. ed.
1983) (all promotors' contracts must be drafted in accordance with federal securities laws).
63. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, §§ 3, 4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d (1982) (current ver-
sion); Texas Securities Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-5, -6 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
64. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77g (1982) (current
version); Texas Securities Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
65. See IA W. FLETCHER, supra note 62, § 190; Ehrich & Bunzl, Promoter's Contracts, 38
YALE L.J. 1011, 1012 (1929).
66. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 53, § 325.
67. See Union Bank v. Jones, 138 Vt. 115, 411 A.2d 1338, 1343 (1980).
68. See Cavaness v. General Corp., 272 S.W.2d 595, 598 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1954),
affid on other grounds, 155 Tex. 69, 283 S.W.2d 33 (1955).
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since the third party was originally content in dealing with a corporation,
the adoption constitutes a novation. Normally, however, a novation can
arise only with the express consent of the third party. 69
In the second situation, when the contract indicates that the corporation is
yet to be formed, the third party knows that the corporation does not yet
exist. The third party thus cannot claim misrepresentation. The question
remains, however, whether the promoter continues to be liable until incorpo-
ration and adoption. Some courts have held that the third party intends
someone to be liable at all times, and that until the corporation comes into
existence and effects a novation the promoter remains liable. 70 Other courts
have looked to the intent of the parties and determined from the circum-
stances that the promoter had no liability at all.71
A corporation will not be held liable on a promoter's contract unless the
corporation adopts the contract. In certain circumstances a newly formed
corporation may, however, claim rights based on a contract formed prior to
incorporation. 72 Generally, a corporation may adopt a contract by written
agreement or corporate resolution.73 Adoption, however, may be implied
from the acts of the corporation or from the fact that the enterprise receives
and retains the benefits of the contract. 74 For example, if the promoter em-
ploys a person and the new corporation subsequently retains the employee, a
court would probably hold that the corporation informally adopted the em-
ployment contract. 75 As a practical matter, properly drafted contractual
provisions and corporate documentation can avoid these various legal
pitfalls.
A promoter has fiduciary concerns in addition to his contractual concerns.
For example, co-promoters, are considered the same as partners and are,
therefore, fiduciaries with respect to each other.76 Moreover, a promoter
occupies a fiduciary position that requires at least fair dealing and good faith
with respect to the proposed corporation and future shareholders. 77 As a
result, the promoter owes a duty of full disclosure concerning preincorpora-
tion promoter activities and contracts to the new corporation, to the direc-
tors, and to the original shareholders and subscribers if these parties are not
independent. This duty of disclosure may also extend to future sharehold-
ers. 78 As previously mentioned, another promoter concern involves liability
69. See Jacobson v. Stem, 96 Nev. 56, 605 P.2d 198, 201 (1980).
70. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Service Feed & Supply, Inc., 271 Md. App. 371, 316 A.2d 800,
803 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974); Cannon Ball Truck Stop, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 501 S.W.2d
927, 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
71. See Quaker Hill, Inc. v. Parr, 148 Colo. 45, 364 P.2d 1056, 1058 (1961).
72. See Joyner v. Alban Group, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 292, 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1976, no writ).
73. An adoption is different from ratificaiton under agency law since ratification assumes
the existence of the principal at the time of the original contract.
74. See DeCarlo v. Gerryco, Inc., 46 N.C. App. 15, 264 S.E.2d 370, 375 (1980). But see
Weatherford, M.W. & N.W. Ry. v. Granger, 86 Tex. 350, 352, 24 S.W. 795, 796 (1894).
75. See McArthur v. Times Printing Co., 48 Minn. 319, 51 N.W. 216, 216 (1892).
76. Sheridan v. McBaine, 564 S.W.2d 540, 544 (Mo. App. 1978).
77. See Duncan v. Brookview House, Inc., 262 S.C. 449, 205 S.E.2d 707, 710-11 (1974).
78. See Morehead & Guleke, How Long is an Arm?.- Business Transactions Other Than at
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under the disclosure provisions of the securities laws in connection with
soliciting venture capital.
79
C. Articles or Certificate of Incorporation
The basic charter document required by the TBCA is the articles of incor-
poration. The articles are filed with the appropriate state official, which is
usually the secretary of state. This document, at least by analogy, consti-
tutes the basic shareholder contract. Matters covered by the articles of in-
corporation include: (1) the corporation name; (2) the period of the
corporation's duration, which may be perpetual; (3) the purpose or purposes
for which the corporation is organized; (4) the aggregate number of shares
that the corporation has authority to issue, the classes of those shares, and
their respective par values; (5) the designation of each class of shares and
their respective preferences, limitations, and relative rights; (6) the provi-
sions concerning preemptive rights; (7) the name and address of the corpora-
tion's registered agent; (8) the minimum capitalization required before
commencing business; (9) the number of directors constituting the initial
board of directors, and the names and addresses of the persons who are to
serve as directors until the first annual meeting of shareholders or until their
successors are elected; and (10) the statement, if the corporation is to be a
close corporation under the TCCL, that "This corporation is a close
corporation." 8 0
Although many practitioners tend to approach the articles of incorpora-
tion in a rather cavalier manner, the importance of the articles as the funda-
mental charter document vis-A-vis the state and the basic "contract"
between the shareholders and the corporation must not be overlooked. 8
Moreover, the articles may not be readily amendable in the future. Accord-
ingly, the attorney should take extreme care in drafting this document. 82
Arm's Length, 44 TEX. B.J. 1234, 1236 (1981) (discussing developments in Texas case law).
Compare Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206, 217 (1908)
(promoter held not liable to corporation or to shareholders subscribing after the manipulative
transaction because promoters represented all the stock at time of transaction and corporation
fully consented to terms), with Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203
Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193, 204-05 (1909) (promotor held liable to present and future sharehold-
ers of corporation for breach of fiduciary duty that had ongoing impact on corporate
capitalization).
79. See Miller v. San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc., 540 F.2d 807, 809-10 (5th Cir. 1976).
80. The articles of incorporation may also include any other provision, not inconsistent
with law, such as provisions concerning regulation of the corporation's internal affairs. TBCA
art. 3.02 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1985).
81. Frequently, the attorney preparing and filing the articles is the incorporator. In this
capacity the attorney may hold certain rights and responsibilities, such as the ability to call the
organizational meeting and the ability to dissolve the corporation prior to the issuance of
shares or commencement of business. TBCA arts. 3.01 (Vernon 1980), 6.01 (Vernon Supp.
1985).
82. To appreciate the complexities that drafting a corporate charter may involve, see
Bromberg, Corporate Organizational Documents & Securities-Forms & Comments Revised, 30




Bylaws are the provisions that the corporation enacts to regulate its inter-
nal actions, including the formal activities of and relationships among the
corporation's officers, directors, and shareholders. The bylaws, which are
usually not filed in any public office, may contain any provisions for the
regulation and management of corporate affairs that are not inconsistent
with law or the articles of incorporation. In this sense, the bylaws form
another basic shareholder contract. The owners thus should carefully con-
sider the contents of the bylaws and the procedure necessary for their
amendment, which is by directors' resolution unless provided otherwise.8 3
E. Organizational Minutes
The organizational minutes are the records of the various meetings held
by the directors or shareholders of the corporation.8 4 The corporate secre-
tary traditionally has the duty of recording the minutes. After the state is-
sues a certificate of incorporation, most corporation codes require an
organizational meeting of directors to adopt bylaws, elect officers, and trans-
act any other necessary matters.85 Possible other matters include the follow-
ing corporate formalities: (1) adoption of a share certificate form and
issuance of initial shares; (2) adoption of a special tax status or plan;
(3) adoption of a corporate seal; and (4) adoption of preincorporation agree-
ments and acceptance of subscriptions.8 6 The other matters transacted at
the organizational meeting might also include the following operational mat-
ters: (1) opening a bank account; (2) retaining corporate attorneys and ac-
countants; (3) appointing board committees; (4) setting officers' and
directors' compensation; (5) filing authorizations to do business in other
states; (6) reimbursing preincorporation expenses; and (7) selecting a fiscal
year.87 The organizational meeting, as other formal meetings of directors or
shareholders, may be held in person or, depending upon the flexibility of the
state corporation law, by either unanimous written consent in lieu of a meet-
ing or by a telephonic conference in which all parties can hear each other.88
F. Other Shareholder Contracts
Other incorporation agreements involving the shareholders may include
preferred stock certificates, option agreements, shareholder pooling agree-
ments, voting trusts, and buy-sell agreements.
IV. ALLOCATING AND MAINTAINING OWNERSHIP INTERESTS
A fundamental consideration in planning the closely-held corporation is
83. See TBCA arts. 2.02, § A(1,3) (Vernon Supp. 1985), 2.23 (Vernon 1980); Bromberg,
supra note 82, at 981.
84. TBCA arts. 2.44, 3.06 (Vernon 1980).
85. TBCA art. 3.06 (Vernon 1980).
86. Bromberg, supra note 82, at 1009.
87. Id.
88. TBCA art. 9.10 (Vernon 1980).
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how to allocate and maintain the desired corporate ownership interests. The
corporate form, through the availability of various types of investment se-
curities, offers considerable flexibility for devising a capital structure that is
consistent with the objectives of each investor/owner. The type of capital
structure chosen, however, not only represents the means by which the cor-
poration will raise funds for operations and growth, but also determines the
method used to allocate profits, risk of loss, ownership, and control of the
business. The capital structure of a corporation consists of various types of
permanent and long-term financial claims in the corporation, including both
equity and debt. Within minimum statutory structures, corporate capitali-
zation is essentially a contractual matter and, therefore, can take nearly an
infinite number of forms. 89
A. Equity Financing
1. Common Stock. Common stock represents the basic equity in a corpo-
ration.90 Each share, which in Texas may or may not be evidenced by a
certificate, 9 ' reflects an initial capital contribution to the corporation and
represents a set of legal rights concerning residual assets on liquidation,
earnings, and voting. These rights, which may be contractual, property,
statutory and/or equitable in nature, are embodied in the corporation's char-
ter or articles of incorporation, the corporation's bylaws, and the corpora-
tion code and case law of the state where the corporation is incorporated. A
shareholder receives an economic return on his investment in common stock
through dividends, if declared by the board of directors, and through the
appreciation realized upon sale of the stock. Upon corporate liquidation, a
common shareholder is last in priority of payment, after secured creditors,
unsecured creditors, and preferred shareholders. 92
Common shareholders, since their equity interest is junior to the interests
of holders of corporate debt and preferred stock, bear the greatest risk of loss
if the corporation fails. The common shareholders, however, generally have
the controlling or sole voting rights in the corporation. The common share-
holders thus are able to exercise control over the corporation's destiny pri-
marily through the election of directors and votes on major corporate
changes. Moreover, because the common shareholders' economic interest in
the corporation is not fixed, as with debt holders or preferred shareholders,
the common shareholders have the greatest opportunity for economic gain if
the corporation is successful.
Corporate statutes are normally flexible with respect to the rights, powers,
and preferences that a corporation may attribute to its various classes of
common stock.9 3 Frequently, a corporation will have two or more classes of
common stock with different voting rights to ensure certain shareholders of
89. See generally I A. DEWING, supra note 24, ch. 3 (describing the various forms of
capital and their impacts on the financial structure of a corporation).
90. Id. at 55-57.
91. See TBCA art. 1.02, §§ A(4), (20), (21) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
92. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS ch. 8 (3d ed. 1983).
93. See TBCA art. 2.12 (Vernon 1980).
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control or veto power over specific corporate actions. 94 For example, a pas-
sive shareholder may contribute more capital than another shareholder who
will be actively involved in the operation of the corporation. Through a split
share structure involving voting and nonvoting shares, the shareholders can
maintain equal voting rights even though the passive shareholder receives a
greater equity interest than the active shareholder. Tax planning may also
influence the capital structure of the corporation. For example, to be eligible
for Subchapter S tax status under the Internal Revenue Code, the corpora-
tion's capital structure must consist of only one class of stock. 95
2. Preferred Stock. Preferred stock is equity stock with a preference as to
dividends, net assets upon liquidation, or both. Thus, like bonds and other
forms of corporate indebtedness, preferred shares have a priority over com-
mon shares with respect to corporate distributions. Unlike interest on in-
debtedness, however, a corporation may not deduct distributions to
preferred shareholders when computing its tax returns. The amount of a
preferred stock dividend is normally fixed on an annual basis and stated as
either a percentage of the preferred stock's par value or a dollar amount per
share per year. Unlike holders of a true debt security, however, the pre-
ferred shareholders generally have no right to a return of their investment at
some definite time in the future, unless the terms of the stock specifically
grant such a right. 96 Furthermore, the preferred shareholders share in net
assets upon liquidation after creditors, although before common
shareholders. 97
Preferred stock is largely a creature of contract. 98 A variety of rights,
powers, and preferences may be given in preferred stock. The basic consid-
erations in structuring preferred stock, other than the rate of dividends, in-
cludes: (1) whether and to what extent the dividends will be cumulative;99
(2) whether the stock will be redeemable; (3) whether the stock will partici-
pate in corporate earnings beyond the stated dividend; (4) whether, and on
what terms and conditions, the stock may be converted into common stock;
(5) whether the stock will have any voting rights; and (6) whether the stock
will have a preference in the assets of the corporation upon liquidation. 1°
Being neither a true equity instrument nor a true debt instrument, preferred
stock is an unusual security from a strictly financial perspective.' 0 ' Pre-
ferred stock, however, maintains significance in attempts to adjust
94. See Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 1962).
95. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D) (West 1984); see infra text accompanying note 122.
96. See I A. DEWING, supra note 24, at 152.
97. Id. at 149-51.
98. Id. at 124; see Buxbaum, Preferred Stock-Law and Draftsmanship, 42 CALIF. L.
REV. 243, 243 (1954).
99. A dividend is cumulative if when the corporation is unable to pay a dividend during a
dividend period, the shareholder has a priority right to future available funds for that
arrearage.
100. See TBCA arts. 2.12 (Vernon 1980), 2.13 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1985). See generally
I A. DEWING, supra note 24, at 123-67 (discussing origins and implications of various forms of
preferred stock).
101. A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 265-66 (1976).
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debt/equity ratios on the corporate balance sheet, in mergers, and in estate
planning involving owners of close corporations. 10 2
3. Options, Rights, and Warrants. Although options, rights, and warrants
normally constitute securities under federal and state securities laws, these
instruments are not stock. Such instruments do not represent equity owner-
ship, but are merely contractual rights to purchase stock in the future on
specified terms and at a set price. 10 3 The documentation underlying these
instruments is contractual in nature and can take differing forms. Although
the terminology for these instruments is interchangeable, options are more
closely associated with employee rights to acquire stock under a plan, rights
are identified with the rights of existing shareholders in future issuances of
stock, and warrants usually relate to a public offering of securities.1°4
4. Legal Capital Considerations. When issuing stock, a corporation must
comply with the legal capital scheme set forth in the relevant state corpora-
tion code. This scheme generally encompasses the composition of the capital
accounts, 10 5 the quality and quantity of consideration given for the
shares, 10 6 and the conditions in which the corporation may pay dividends 10 7
and repurchase its own stock.' 0 8
B. Debt Financing. Bonds, Debentures, and Other Notes
Bonds and debentures represent commitments of funds by creditors to a
corporation for a relatively long period of time, usually five years or more.
A bond is a secured corporate obligation, whereas a debenture is unsecured.
The maturity date of these securities is the date when the corporation must
pay the principal sum. The face or par value of a bond or debenture, cus-
tomarily expressed in multiples of $1,000, is the amount that the corporation
must pay to the holder on the maturity date. In addition to paying the prin-
cipal at the maturity date, the corporation must also pay to the holder a
fixed amount of interest at regular intervals, normally semiannually.10 9
The issuance of bonds and debentures is very similar to a loan. The cor-
poration borrows money from the purchasers of the securities. In return, the
102. See Donaldson, In Defense of Preferred Stock, 40 HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1962,
at 123.
103. Options, rights, and warrants have a wide range of uses such as employee incentives,
as a companion sweetener in public debt offerings, and as a device to maintain shareholder
goodwill and interest in the corporation.
104. See Reiling, Warrants in Bond-Warrant Units: A Survey and Assessment, 70 MICH. L.
REV. 1411, 1411-20 (1972). For a discussion on the use of options in closely-held corpora-
tions, including tax implications, see W. PAINTER, supra note 4, ch. 10.
105. See TBCA art. 2.17 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1985).
106. TBCA arts. 2.15 (Vernon 1980), 2.16 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1985).
107. TBCA arts. 2.38, 2.39 (Vernon 1980).
108. TBCA art. 2.12, § B(1) (Vernon 1980). See generally B. MANNING, LEGAL CAPITAL
84-90 (2d ed. 1981) (discussing statutory restrictions on the issuance of stock and the composi-
tion of corporate financial structure).
109. The fixed rate of interest on a bond or debenture is often called the coupon rate. See




corporation promises to pay principal and interest to the purchasers and to
abide by certain contractual conditions contained in the certificate issued to
the holder or in an indenture.
The indenture constitutes a fundamental corporate document.°10 The in-
denture is generally very complex and contractually binds not only the cor-
porate borrower and lender, but also a trustee who oversees the
administration of the indenture.I' When the corporation issues debt securi-
ties to the public, the corporation ordinarily must register the indenture
under the federal Trust Indenture Act." l2 Because of the complexity and
expense involved in preparing an indenture, however, indentures are often
avoided in close corporation situations.
Holders of bonds, debentures, or other forms of corporate notes do not
share directly in the control of the corporation. The issuance of these securi-
ties, unless convertible into common stock, will not dilute the equity position
of the existing common shareholders. In liquidation preference, however,
bonds and debentures are superior to equity. Furthermore, provisions in the
indenture can provide the bond and debenture holders with considerable in-
fluence over the corporation's affairs and operations. The indenture may
require the corporation to establish a sinking fund"I3 or to make serial re-
payments prior to maturity."l 4 Often in a close corporation setting, neither
a formal bond or debenture will be used to evidence the corporate indebted-
ness. Instead, the corporation will simply issue an unsecured or secured
promissory note, although such notes may contain many sophisticated fea-
tures such as redeemability, subordination, and convertibility.
C. Leverage
A fundamental business and legal consideration in planning the corporate
capital structure is the proper ratio of debt to equity. A capital structure
that includes only common stock offers the significant advantage of flexibil-
ity in raising money in the future. If the corporation issues various forms of
equity, however, the flexibility of an equity capitalization may be restricted.
Debt financing also offers advantages.'1 5 In addition to the advantage of
nondilution of corporate control, debt financing may be a less expensive
method of raising money if through debt financing common shareholders are
able to leverage their investment. Leveraging is successful when the eco-
nomic return on the debt exceeds the cost of maintaining the debt, provided
that the corporation can continue to produce a sufficient income stream to
110. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, COMMENTARIES ON MODEL DEBENTURE IN-
DENTURE PROVISIONS 1-10 (1971).
111. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVISIONS
14 (1967).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1982) (current version).
113. A sinking fund is an arrangement in which a fixed amount of money, or an amount
determined by formula, is set aside each year toward the ultimate redemption of the entire
issue of bonds or debentures.
114. See 1 A. DEWING, supra note 24, ch. 8.
115. Debt financing is also known as leveraging or trading on equity.
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meet the required debt repayments. Successful leveraging enables the com-
mon shareholders to derive economic benefits without contributing addi-
tional capital and without diluting their ownership interest in the
corporation. In a period of high interest rates or volatile corporate earnings,
however, leveraging is very risky. 116
A tax issue related to the debt/equity question involves "thin capitaliza-
tion," which occurs when a sole or majority shareholder or all shareholders
proportionately loan excessive funds to an undercapitalized corporation.
For tax purposes, the courts may treat the indebtedness as stock and
recharacterize the distributions paid on the indebtedness as dividends, in
which case the corporation cannot deduct interest on the loans. 1' 7 More-
over, bankruptcy courts and other courts considering insolvency matters
possess the equitable power to recharacterize a controlling shareholder's
loan to a troubled corporation as equity, thus subordinating the share-
holder's claim to the claims of outside creditors."i 8
D. Selective Legal Techniques for Maintaining Ownership Interests
1. Stock Classification. The use of different classes of stock facilitates the
allocation of both equity" 19 and voting' 20 interests within a corporation.
The TBCA permits stock to be divided into classes, which may consist of
shares with or without par value. 12 1 Creating more than one class of stock,
however, may jeopardize a Subchapter S election. Generally, the Internal
Revenue Service considers differences between shares with respect to voting
rights, dividend rights, and liquidation preference to result in different
classes of stock for Subchapter S purposes, thus preventing Subchapter S
election. Recent tax code amendments, however, make clear that differentia-
tion in the voting rights of common stock or the use of straight debt does not
violate the one class restriction. 22
2. Preemptive Rights. Statutory preemptive rights can also facilitate the
allocation of both equity and voting control within the corporation. 12 3
These statutory rights have arisen from the judicial doctrine of preemptive
rights, which courts developed mainly from equitable considerations. The
doctrine of preemptive rights provided a shareholder with the right to
purchase in priority to others a new issuance of stock in proportion to his
present percentage interest in the corporation. 124 The TBCA has codified
116. See H. GUTHMANN & H. DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 167 (4th ed.
1962).
117. See I.R.C. § 385 (1982).
118. See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1939).
119. 1 A. DEWING, supra note 24, at 123.
120. See Soldofsky, Classified Common Stock, 23 Bus. LAW. 899, 899-900 (1968).
121. TBCA art. 2.12, § A (Vernon 1980).
122. See I.R.C. § 1361(c)(4), (5) (West 1984).
123. See Drinker, The Preemptive Right to Subscribe to New Shares, 43 HARV. L. REV. 586
(1930); Morawetz, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders, 42 HARV. L. REV. 186 (1928).
124. See Bonnet v. First Nat'l Bank, 60 S.W. 325, 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, writ dism'd);
Frey, Shareholders Pre-emptive Rights, 38 YALE L.J. 563, 563 (1929).
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and expanded this common law shareholders' right.' 25 The TBCA charac-
terizes the preemptive right as an opportunity to acquire stock or other se-
curities under the terms and conditions set by the board of directors.' 26
Presumably, the board must exercise its power subject to fiduciary standards
and, in the case of a self-interested transaction, subject to the intrinsic fair-
ness rule. 127
Preemptive rights may provide merely illusory protection to a share-
holder. Legal concerns respecting preemptive rights exist with respect to
funding, coverage, and proper purpose. First, a shareholder may not have
sufficient funds or sufficient collateral to raise funds to exercise a preemptive
right. Even if exercised, the preemptive right may be a costly way for a
shareholder, particularly a minority shareholder, to maintain his proportion-
ate interest in the corporation. Second, the statutory exception to preemp-
tive rights concerning stock issued to employees may be used to circumvent
the minority shareholders' preemptive rights.128 Third, in several cases
outside Texas, courts have ruled that a shareholder's preemptive right is the
right not to have to purchase additional stock to avoid dilution of his equity
interest if a valid business reason does not exist for issuing the additional
stock. a2 9 Before recommending the use of preemptive rights, the attorney
thus should carefully assess the problems that surround his cli-
ent/shareholder's desire to maintain his proportionate interest. The attor-
ney should also consider the effect such rights might have on future
corporate financing plans.
3. Stock Transfer Restrictions. Under Texas law corporate stock is the per-
sonal property of the owner and is transferrable in accordance with chapter
125. TBCA art. 2.22-1 (Vernon 1980); accord DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(3) (1983).
The TBCA provides a shareholder with "a preemptive right to acquire additional, unissued, or
treasury shares of the corporation, or securities of the corporation convertible into or carrying
a right to subscribe or to acquire shares, except to the extent limited or denied by this Article
or by the articles of incorporation." TBCA art. 2.22-1, § A (Vernon 1980). If preemptive
rights are to be denied, therefore, they must usually be expressly denied in the articles of
incorporation. The TBCA specifies, however, that unless otherwise provided in the articles of
incorporation, no preemptive right exists in situations involving the issuance of stock: "(a)...
to employees pursuant to approval by the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the
shares entitled to vote thereon or when authorized by and consistent with a plan theretofore
approved by such a vote of shareholders; or (b) ... otherwise than for cash." TBCA art. 2.22-
1, § B(1) (Vernon 1980). Moreover, the TBCA generally precludes, unless provided otherwise
in the articles of incorporation, preemptive rights with respect to either stock of different
classes or stock having preferential rights. TBCA art. 2.22-1, § B(2), (3), (4) (Vernon 1980).
In comparison, Delaware law denies all preemptive rights unless expressly provided for in the
articles of incorporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(3) (1983).
126. TBCA art. 2.22-1, § B(5) (Vernon 1980).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 47-5 1.
128. Elaborating in a provision of the articles of incorporation the exact nature and extent
of the preemptive right given and combining this provision with additional charter provisions
concerning the required vote to issue new shares and amend the articles of incorporation is one
method for a minority shareholder to protect his preemptive rights. See L.L. Minor Co. v.
Perkins, 246 Ga. 8, 268 S.E.2d 637, 643 n.15 (1980).
129. See, e.g., Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236, 240-41
(1953); Katzowitz v. Sidler, 24 N.Y.2d 512, 518-19, 249 N.E.2d 359, 363-64, 301 N.Y.S.2d
470, 475-76 (1969); Maguire v. Osborne, 388 Pa. 121, 130 A.2d 157, 159 (1957).
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8 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. 130 One of the fundamental
rights of a property owner is the freedom to dispose of the property as the
owner sees fit. Accordingly, the public policy of Texas and most other juris-
dictions prohibits unreasonable restraints on alienation of personal prop-
erty.' 3' Stock transfer restrictions, however, if properly structured and
drafted within the statutory guidelines and case law standards, can be an
important technique to control the distribution of and succession to power
within a corporation. 132
a. Purposes. Stock transfer restrictions may serve a variety of purposes
within the close corporation. First, stock transfer restrictions can enable the
founding shareholders to control the substitution or addition of shareholders
in the future. The shareholders may desire this control to prevent the intru-
sion of a disruptive or incompatible shareholder 13 3 or simply because they
have relied upon the identity of other founding shareholders. 134 Second,
stock transfer restrictions can prevent a shareholder from gaining control or
otherwise altering the allocation of control among the founding sharehold-
ers. Third, federal and state securities laws may require stock transfer re-
strictions for the stock to qualify for a statutory exemption.135 Fourth, stock
transfer restrictions can prevent the transfer of stock to a nonqualifying or
nonconsenting holder or the distribution otherwise of stock in a manner vio-
lative of the numerical limitations of Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue
Code. 13 6 In this way, the restrictions can preserve the Subchapter S tax sta-
tus of the close corporation. Fifth, a buy-sell arrangement can provide li-
quidity to a shareholder or his family in the event of disability, death, or
divorce of the shareholder. Finally, a mandatory buy-out provision can pro-
vide a shareholder who works for the corporation with incentive to remain
an employee of the corporation.
b. Types. Several types of stock transfer restrictions exist to accomplish
these objectives. First, the shareholders may create a right of first refusal.
This right provides the corporation or nonselling shareholders with an op-
tion to purchase shares from a selling shareholder at the best price offered by
130. TBCA art. 2.22, § A (Vernon 1980).
131. See Note, Corporations-Stock Alienation Restrictions-Power of Directors to Restrict
Issued Stock, 14 Sw. L.J. 106, 106 (1960).
132. See Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1318, 1320 (1958).
133. An outsider who acquires a single share has the basic shareholder rights to inspect
corporate books and records, to sue in a shareholder or derivative action, and to vote on funda-
mental corporate matters even if his stock is classified as nonvoting. Similarly, a new share-
holder with different managerial ideas can disrupt a consensus among the founding
shareholders.
134. This desire is related to the concept of delictus personae in partnership law. See J.
CRANE & A. BROMBERG, CRANE & BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 43 (1968).
135. Generally, a close corporation issues stock without registering the stock under appli-
cable state and federal securities laws by relying on a statutory exemption. The issued shares
constitute restricted securities and cannot be transferred or distributed except under certain
circumstances.
136. See I.R.C. §§ 1361, 1362 (West 1984).
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a bona fide third party. 137 Texas courts have generally upheld rights of first
refusal.' 38 Second, the shareholders may adopt a consent restraint, which
provides that stock may not be transferred except with the consent of the
corporation, its directors, or other shareholders. Although courts have tra-
ditionally questioned the validity of consent restraints, 139 the TBCA has per-
mitted reasonable consent restraints since 1973.140 A third stock transfer
restriction involves a buy-sell or cross-purchase agreement. A buy-sell
agreement obligates the corporation to purchase the stock of a shareholder
on the occurrence of a specified event, such as retirement, disability, death,
divorce, or termination of employment of the shareholder. A cross-purchase
agreement obligates the nonselling shareholders to purchase stock under
these circumstances. 14 1 The TBCA expressly provides for both types of
agreements. 142 Finally, a stock transfer restriction may restrict transfers to
specified persons. One can draft numerous variations and combinations of
these basic types of stock transfer restrictions to meet a specific situation.143
c. Legal Standards. Because stock transfer restrictions restrain the
shareholder's right to alienate property, Texas courts will review the restric-
tions under a reasonableness standard. 44 Under this standard, a stock
transfer restriction must have, as of the time that it is imposed, some pro-
spective relationship to legitimate objectives of the corporation or its share-
137. See TBCA art. 2.22, § D(l) (Vernon Supp. 1985). Specific events other than a pro-
posed sale to a third party, including a proposed sale to another shareholder, death, disability,
or retirement of a shareholder, or a gift or pledge of stock, may precipitate first refusal rights.
Furthermore, the shareholders may adopt a formula other than the price offered by a third
party to set the option price. A. GUILD, D. DAVIS & D. HOXIES, STOCK PURCHASE AGREE-
MENTS & THE CLOSE CORPORATION 18 (3d ed. 1978).
138. See Ling & Co. v. Trinity Say. & Loan Ass'n, 482 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. 1972); Cole-
man v. Kettering, 289 S.W.2d 953, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1956, no writ); accord
Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 A. 723, 727 (1930).
139. See Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 1327, 1327-29 (1976).
140. TBCA art. 2.22, § D(3) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
141. See A. GUILD, D. DAVIS & D. HOXIES, supra note 137, at 18; Bradley, Stock Transfer
Restrictions & Buy-Sell Agreements, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 139, 175.
142. See TBCA art. 2.22, § D(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985); accord DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 202(c)(2) (1983). A corporation's obligation to repurchase stock is, however, subject to the
statutory requirements respecting stock redemptions and repurchases. Id. art. 2.03 (Vernon
1980 & Supp. 1984).
143. See O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfers of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning
and Drafting, 65 HARV. L. REV. 773, 777 (1952).
144. See TBCA art. 2.22, § C (Vernon 1980). The TCCL appears to permit restrictions on
share transfers that TBCA article 2.22, § C does not. TCCL art. 12.32, § A(2) (Vernon Supp.
1985) specifically states:
All shareholders of a close corporation may make one or more shareholders'
agreements. The business and affairs of a close corporation or the relations
among the shareholders that may be regulated by a shareholders' agreement
include with limitation:
(2) buy-sell, first option, first refusal, or similar arrangements with respect to
the close corporation's shares or other securities, and restrictions on their trans-
fer, including restrictions beyond those permitted to be imposed by Article 2.22
of this Act.
I believe, however, that courts will also apply a reasonableness standard to stock restrictions
created under the TCCL.
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holders. 14 5 Accordingly, a court must analyze stock transfer restrictions on
a case-by-case basis in light of the specific needs and expectations of the
corporation and its shareholders. The TBCA provides that if a stock trans-
fer restriction is reasonable and noted conspicuously on the security, the re-
striction is enforceable against the holder of the security or any successor or
transferee of the holder. 146 If the restriction is not noted conspicuously,
however, the restriction is ineffective except against a person with actual
knowledge of the restriction. 147
d. Statutorily Permissible Restraints. The TBCA expressly approves of
several types of stock transfer restraints. As noted above, however, courts
will apply a reasonableness standard to all restraints. 148 Although the statu-
tory laundry list of permissible restraints under the TBCA is not exhaustive,
the prudent lawyer should structure a specific restriction within the context
of a statutory provision. The TBCA provides that a stock transfer restric-
tion is valid if: (1) the stock transfer restriction obligates holders of the re-
stricted stock to offer that stock to the corporation or other shareholders;
(2) the stock transfer restriction obligates the corporation or other share-
holders to purchase the stock; (3) the stock transfer restriction requires the
corporation or other shareholders to consent to any transfer of the restricted
stock; (4) the stock transfer restriction prohibits the transfer of the restricted
stock to designated persons, if such designation is not unreasonable; or
(5) the stock transfer restriction maintains the corporation's status as a Sub-
chapter S corporation under the Internal Revenue Code or as a close corpo-
ration under the TBCA. 149
e. Location of Restrictions. Stock transfer restrictions may be placed in
the articles of incorporation, in the bylaws, or in a separate agreement. In
the case of a new corporation, including stock transfer restrictions in the
articles of incorporation may be the easiest means. This alternative offers
two advantages. First, including restrictions in the articles ties the restric-
tions to the source of corporate existence and thus provides evidence against
claims that the restrictions are unreasonable. Second, the articles constitute
a public record and thus provide third parties with constructive notice of the
restrictions even if the restrictions are not conspicuously noted on the stock
certificates.
145. Panel Discussion, The Problems of Closely-Held Corporations, in PROCEEDINGS 1955
TEXAS BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT INSTITUTE 105, 142 (description of standard by Paul
Carrington).
146. TBCA art. 2.22, § C (Vernon 1980).
147. TBCA art. 2.22, § C (Vernon 1980). The statute defines "conspicuous" as:
The location of such information or use of type of sufficient size, color, or char-
acter that a reasonable person against whom such information may operate
should notice it. For example, a printed or typed statement in capitals, or bold-
face or underlined type, or in type that is larger than or that contrasts in color
with that used for other statements on the same certificate is "conspicuous."
TBCA art. 1.02, § A(19) (Vernon 1980).
148. TBCA art. 2.22, § D (Vernon Supp. 1985).
149. TBCA art. 2.22, § D (Vernon Supp. 1985).
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Including restrictions in the articles of incorporation also has disadvan-
tages. The shareholders may not want the details of their contractual ar-
rangements to be a matter of public record. Furthermore, unless the
restrictions are in the articles, corporate expenditures pursuant to the restric-
tions are open to attack as ultra vires. Finally, less than all of the sharehold-
ers can amend the articles and thereby circumvent the restrictions, although
a provision in the chapter requiring unanimity in order to amend the restric-
tions will remedy this problem.
One can also include the restrictions on stock transfer in the bylaws of the
corporation. Since the bylaws contain the guidelines for the conduct of cor-
porate activities, the bylaws provide a convenient document in which to re-
peat the restrictions. If the bylaws is the sole document in which the
restrictions are contained, however, the attorney must be careful to ensure
that the directors cannot amend the bylaws. This protection requires a suit-
able provision in the articles of incorporation.
Stock transfer restrictions are often set forth in a separate contractual
agreement or incorporated in a buy-sell or stock purchase agreement. These
ancillary contractual arrangements can more elaborately describe the techni-
calities involved in the implementation of the restrictions. These ancillary
arrangements, however, should not be the sole source of the restrictions;
rather, separate contractual arrangements should be combined with consis-
tent provisions in the articles of incorporation or bylaws. 150
In the case of the adoption of bylaws or corporate consent to an agree-
ment containing a stock transfer restriction, the corporation must file a
counterpart of the adopted bylaw provision or the agreement at its principal
place of business and its registered office.1 5 1 Shareholders have the same
right to examine the bylaws provision or agreement as to examine the corpo-
ration's books and records.1 52 The TBCA permits a corporation to amend
its articles of incorporation to include an agreement containing a stock trans-
fer restriction without restating the agreement, provided a true and complete
copy of the agreement is attached to the articles of amendment.153
f Parties. Transfer restrictions will, according to the terms of the rele-
vant instrument, run to the corporation and to certain or all of the share-
holders. As a practical matter, the corporation is often in a better position
than the nonselling shareholders to repurchase the stock. When the corpo-
150. See Irwin v. Prestressed Structures, Inc., 420 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
151. TBCA art. 2.22, § B (Vernon 1980). The TBCA permits a corporation that has
adopted a bylaw restriction or has agreed to a contractual transfer restriction to file such provi-
sion as a matter of public record with the secretary of state. TBCA art. 2.22, § E (Vernon
Supp. 1985).
152. TBCA art. 2.22, § B (Vernon 1980).
153. TBCA art. 2.22, § F (Vernon 1980). The advantage of this procedure is unknown to
me. Professor Bateman, one of the draftsmen of the 1975 TBCA revisions, concedes that the
practical value of this latter provision "is not readily apparent." Bateman & Dawson, The
1975 Amendments to the Texas Business Corporation Act and the Texas Securities Act, 6 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 951, 963 (1975).
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ration assumes a mandatory buy-sell obligation, however, the shareholders
should be additional parties in the event that the corporation is unable,
either financially 154 or under TBCA repurchase restrictions, 155 to redeem
the stock.' 56 Successive options may be given in which the corporation has
the first opportunity to purchase; if the corporation is unable or unwilling to
purchase, then the option runs on a pro rata basis to the remaining share-
holders. A mandatory buy-sell arrangement involving a shareholder
purchase combined with a backup purchase by the corporation, however,
generally should be avoided due to the possibility that the IRS will assert
that the corporation's discharge of the shareholder's obligation is a dividend
distribution.157 If the corporation acquires the stock, the corporation must
then consider whether to retire the stock, hold the stock as treasury stock, or
reissue the stock. Moreover, as the number of shareholders increases, the
successful implementation of the buy-sell becomes more difficult and
complex. ' 58
g. Other Practical Considerations. Other practical considerations con-
cerning stock transfer restrictions include drafting, price, duration, notation,
funding, and tax consequences. 159 First, workable stock transfer restrictions
must be drafted in charter documents or ancillary agreements, a process
often arduous and filled with pitfalls. The documents should specify: (1) the
person to whom the transfer restrictions run; (2) the number of shares to
which the purchase option applies;' 60 (3) the rights of other remaining
shareholders if one remaining shareholder decides not to participate in the
purchase; (4) the rights of parties to a divorce if stock constitutes community
154. See TBCA art. 2.03 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1985).
155. See TBCA art. 4.09 (Vernon 1980).
156. See Hall v. Weller, Hall & Jeffery, Inc., 497 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1973, writ refd n.r.e.).
157. For a discussion of the tax considerations of corporate and shareholder repurchase
arrangements, see Lischer, Buy-Sell Agreements for Closely-Held Business Interests, 44 TEX.
B.J. 283, 285-88 (1981).
158. A restriction created by agreement will only bind the contracting parties. Whether a
restriction created by the articles of incorporation will bind all future shareholders or an origi-
nal shareholder who objected to the restrictions is subject to question. See B & H Warehouse
v. Atlas Van Lines, 490 F.2d 818, 821-22 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying Delaware law). The case
may be different under the TCCL. TCCL art. 12.36, § A (Vernon Supp. 1985) states:
A shareholders' agreement, if executed in conformance with [the procedural re-
quirements of] Article 12.33 of this Act, is considered to be an agreement among
all the shareholders of the close corporation and is binding and enforceable in
accordance with its terms on all shareholders of the close corporation regardless
of whether a particular shareholder acquired shares in the close corporation by
purchase, gift, bequest, or otherwise, or whether the shareholder had actual
knowledge of the existence of the shareholders' agreement at the time of acquir-
ing shares. A transferee or assignee of shares of a close corporation with respect
to which there is a shareholders' agreement is bound by the shareholders' agree-
ment for all purposes whether or not the transferee or assignee executed or was
aware of the agreement.
159. Since stock transfer restrictions inherently contain the seeds of friction and dispute,
adequate and workable dispute resolution techniques should also be included in the instrument
creating such restrictions. See infra notes 253-79 and accompanying text.




property;1 61 (5) the rights of an executor or administrator in voting and
other corporate matters in the event of a shareholder's death; and (6) the
events that trigger a purchase or buy-out.
Second, the parties must determine the purchase price or method for de-
termining that price in the instrument creating the restriction.' 62 Book
value, which can be ascertained by a quick review of the corporation's bal-
ance sheet, is the simplest (but often not the fairest) method of determining
the purchase price.163 If book value is used, however, the lawyer should give
considerable thought to defining that term and should not simply rely upon
the balance sheet of the corporation. Also, the integrity of the client's ac-
countant and the accounting principles that the corporation uses will be
most important in ensuring the integrity of any value derived.
164
Third, no express statutory restrictions exist concerning the duration of
stock transfer restrictions.' 65 Nevertheless, selecting a reasonable duration
is important because a court will review the duration when considering the
overall reasonableness of the restriction. Fourth, the TBCA requires a con-
spicuous notation of the restriction on the stock certificate.166 Fifth, the
parties must decide how to fund a purchase pursuant to a stock transfer
restriction. Frequently used funding methods include: (1) a one-time cash
payment; (2) a series of payments, in which case security for the debt be-
comes an important issue; (3) a corporate sinking fund; or (4) a key-person
insurance policy. Finally, stock transfer restrictions, particularly with re-
spect to buy-sell and cross-purchase arrangements and funding through in-
surance, can raise numerous income, estate, and gift tax problems. The
161. See Earthman's, Inc. v. Earthman, 526 S.W.2d 192, 202 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[ist Dist.] 1975, no writ).
162. One or more of the following methods of determining the purchase price is generally
used: (1) book value; (2) capitalization of earnings; (3) fair market value as determined either
by a disinterested appraiser or through arbitration; (4) fair market value as based on a bona
fide third party offer; or (5) percentage of projected or actual net earnings from a specified
number of future years. See Matsen, Establishing the Price for Closely Held Business Buy-Sell
Arrangements, 5 J. CORP. TAX'N 134, 138-47 (1978).
163. Book value, however, may be wholly inadequate since questions arise: (1) whether
goodwill should be included; (2) whether the book value corresponds to actual value, particu-
larly in inflationary times; (3) whether assets are reflected on the books at costs that have
significantly fallen or appreciated; (4) whether the true value of the business is in its book value
or its ability to generate annual earnings; and (5) whether the corporation's methods of depre-
ciation and inventory valuation are those that are commonly used in the industry.
164. For an example of the problems that can arise in the valuation process, even with a
prearranged valuation mechanism, see Sammons Enters. v. Manley, 540 S.W.2d 751, 753-57
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.).
165. Stock transfer restrictions generally terminate either according to the terms of the
instrument creating them or through disuse. Professor Hamilton suggests that while these
restrictions themselves are usually unrestricted as to duration, it "may be desirable to establish
very precise time periods for the exercise of rights granted by such restrictions." 20 R. HAM-
ILTON, supra note 53, at 151.
166. TBCA art. 2.19, § G (Vernon 1980) provides that stock certificates subject to a trans-
fer restriction shall contain either: (1) a statement of the restriction conspicuously set forth on
the certificate's face; (2) a conspicuous reference on the certificate's face to such restrictive
statement, with a summary statement on the back of the certificate; or (3) a conspicuous state-
ment on the certificate's face or back that a restriction exists and that the corporation will
furnish the shareholder a copy of the document containing the restriction or that such docu-
ment is on file with the secretary of state.
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corporate attorney, unless personally familiar with such tax implications,
should seek tax counsel with respect to these matters.1 67
V. ALLOCATING AND MAINTAINING "MANAGERIAL" CONTROL
A. The Problems
A fundamental concern in organizing a corporation is the allocation and
maintenance of "managerial" control. The most significant practical diffi-
culties encountered in allocating and maintaining this control within the
newly formed corporation are: (1) ensuring that each owner can elect at
least one, and possibly more than one, director; (2) providing that the own-
ers may vote their shares together to elect several directors and control the
board of directors; (3) providing shareholder controls over various director
actions; and (4) providing continuity of competent and acceptable managers
on a day-to-day basis.168
B. Selective Legal Techniques
This section discusses seven legal techniques that practitioners can use to
address issues of control within the corporation. In addition to these seven
techniques, the use of stock transfer restrictions, including buy-sell arrange-
ments 169 and preemptive rights,170 may impact the allocation of managerial
control. 171
1. Stock Classification. Under the common law, members of a corporation
had equal rights, and each member was entitled to one vote and no more.
The TBCA provides that each validly issued outstanding share is entitled to
one vote unless the articles of incorporation or TBCA provides otherwise. 1 72
The TBCA presumes all stock to have voting rights unless the articles specif-
ically provide otherwise. The TBCA expressly provides that the articles of
incorporation may limit or deny voting rights to any class of stock to the
extent that such limitation or denial is not inconsistent with the TBCA.173
Voting rights as to certain fundamental matters, such as charter amend-
ments, ' 74 voluntary dissolution, 175 merger or consolidation, 176 and disposi-
tion of substantially all assets, 177 cannot be denied to a class of shares.
The TBCA permits the articles of incorporation to provide for more or
167. See Z. CAVITCH, TAX PLANNING FOR CORPORATIONS & SHAREHOLDERS ch. 7
(1980); Lischer, supra note 157, at 285-88; Turley, Changing Capital Structures and Sharehold-
ers in a Closely-Held Texas Corporation, 11 Hous. L. REV. 351, 351-408 (1974).
168. See Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems, and Needs of the Close Corpora-
tion, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 4, 5.
169. See supra notes 130-67 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
171. See O'Neal, Control Distribution Devices, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 48, 59-60.
172. TBCA art. 2.29 (Vernon 1980).
173. TBCA art. 2.12, § A (Vernon 1980).
174. TBCA art. 4.03, § B (Vernon Supp. 1985).
175. TBCA art. 6.03 (Vernon 1980).
176. TBCA art. 5.03 (Vernon 1980).
177. TBCA art. 5.10 (Vernon 1980).
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less than one vote per share. 178 Consequently, variations in the voting rights
of classes of stock are possible. Assume, for example, that Ms. Jones and
Mr. Smith desire to form a corporation. They agree that each will have
equal voting control, even though Ms. Jones will contribute twice as much
capital as Mr. Smith. If the corporation has only one class of common
stock, the corporation will not have the desired voting control. The corpora-
tion, however, can issue two classes of common stock, Class A and Class B,
each class having equal voting power and each share having equal ownership
rights. If the corporation issues two thousand shares of Class A to Ms.
Jones and one thousand shares of Class B to Mr. Smith, then each class of
stock will have the power to elect half the board of directors. Thus, this
structure enables the participants to share voting control equally despite
their different equity contributions. 179
Different classes of stock can similarly be used to deny voting rights in
certain matters and give voting rights in other matters, or to create a class of
nonvoting stock with contingent voting rights. 180
2. Irrevocable Proxies. A proxy is a special form of agency in which one
person is authorized to vote the stock of another. The irrevocable proxy is a
control technique often used in conjunction with a shareholder pooling ar-
rangement. 181 Because the law surrounding the use of irrevocable proxies is
cloaked in terms of basic agency principles, the argument is often made that
a proxy, unless coupled with an interest, is revocable notwithstanding the
proxy's express terms to the contrary. 182
Under the TBCA a proxy is irrevocable if either the proxy instrument's
express terms make the proxy irrevocable or the proxy is made irrevocable
by law. 183 Few Texas cases have defined when a proxy is made irrevocable
by law. Roberts v. Whitson, 184 a 1945 case that has been criticized, indicates
in dictum that an irrevocable proxy, unless coupled with an interest, is con-
178. TBCA art. 2.29, § A (Vernon 1980).
179. The same result could be achieved by having Class A voting stock and Class B non-
voting stock with Ms. Jones and Mr. Smith each receiving 1,000 shares of Class A stock and
with Ms. Jones also receiving 1,000 shares of Class B stock. Under another variation Ms.
Jones is issued 2,000 shares of Class A stock and Mr. Smith is issued 1,000 shares of Class B
stock, but with Class B stock having two votes per share. See Annot., 3 A.L.R.4th 1204, 1206-
07 (1981).
180. Case law exists outside Texas suggesting that a class of stock may be created that has
only voting rights and none of the conventional rights to dividends or liquidation. Lehrman v.
Cohen, 43 Del. Ch. 222, 222 A.2d 800, 806 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Stroh v. Blackhawk Holding
Corp., 48 Ill. 471, 272 N.E.2d 1, 4-7 (1971).
181. See Comment, Voting Trusts and Irrevocable Proxies, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 480, 484 (1968).
TBCA art. 2.29, § C (Vernon 1980).
182. See Comment, Irrevocable Proxies, 43 TEX. L. REV. 733, 736-37 (1965).
183. TBCA art. 2.29, § C (Vernon 1980). This article provides:
A shareholder may vote either in person or by proxy executed in writing by the
shareholder or by his duly authorized attorney in fact. No proxy shall be valid
after eleven (11) months from the date of its execution unless otherwise provided
in the proxy. A proxy shall be revocable unless expressly provided therein to be
irrevocable and unless otherwise made irrevocable by law.
Id.
184. 188 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
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trary to public policy.' 85 Although a strong argument can be made that use
of the "coupled with an interest" rationale is inappropriate in the context of
shareholders' arrangements, the prudent course is nevertheless to ascertain
whether the irrevocable proxy is in fact coupled with an interest.
186
The difficult problem concerns what "coupled with an interest" means.
Delaware law states that the coupled with an interest requirement is satisfied
by either a particular interest in the stock or general interest in the corpora-
tion. 187 Unfortunately the matter remains unclear under Texas law. If an
irrevocable proxy is used in conjunction with a shareholders' agreement pur-
suant to the TBCA, 188 one could argue that the irrevocable proxy is enforce-
able to the same extent as the shareholders' agreement. 189 From a practical
viewpoint no justification exists for distinguishing between an irrevocable
proxy and a shareholder pooling arrangement or a voting trust. I recom-
mend, however, because of the uncertainties surrounding the irrevocable
proxy, that the irrevocable proxy not be used unless required for structuring
the desired control arrangement.
3. Cumulative Voting Rights. Cumulative voting rights are used to assure
minority shareholders a voice on the board of directors of a corporation.190
The cumulative voting right is a statutory device for increasing the possibil-
ity that shareholders will be represented on the board of directors. Essen-
tially, cumulative voting allows a shareholder to multiply the number of
shares held by the number of directors to be elected and to cast that total
number of votes as he chooses. For example, assume that seven directors are
to be elected and that the shareholder owns one thousand shares, each of
which entitles him to one vote. Under cumulative voting, the shareholder
would have seven thousand votes to spread among one or more of the vari-
ous candidates. 191 The TBCA provides that cumulative voting exists unless
expressly prohibited by the articles of incorporation. 192' The shareholder
who intends to vote cumulatively is required to give written notice of that
intent to the secretary of the corporation on or before the day preceding the
election.193 Moreover, all shareholders may vote cumulatively if any share-
holder gives the required notice.
Cumulative voting can become quite tricky and dangerous. A graphic
example is contained in the 1883 Pennsylvania case of Pierce v. Common-
185. Id. at 878.
186. See W. PAINTER, supra note 4, at 151-53.
187. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(c) (1983).
188. TBCA art. 2.30, § B (Vernon 1980).
189. TBCA art. 2.30, § B (Vernon 1980). For a sample form of a Joint Irrevocable Proxy,
see Lewis, A Joint Irrevocable Proxy, 4 ALI-ABA COURSE MAT'LS J., June 1980, at 105.
190. Campbell, The Origin and Growth of Cumulative Voting for Directors, Bus. LAW.,
May 1955, at 3, 5-6.
191. See generally C. WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRECTORS 47-156 (1950)
(detailing the use and mechanics of cumulative voting).
192. TBCA art. 2.29, § D(l) (Vernon 1980). Conversely, Delaware law presumes that cu-
mulative voting rights are denied. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (1983).
193. TBCA art. 2.29, § D(2) (Vernon 1980).
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wealth,194 which involved the election of six directors. The majority held
3,400 shares and the minority held 3,000 shares. The majority spread its
20,400 cumulative votes evenly among six candidates. The opposing minor-
ity, which had 18,000 cumulative votes, ran two dummy nominees and
spread their votes over only four candidates and thus captured four seats and
control of the board.
Generally, the smaller the board of directors the less effective cumulative
voting is in ensuring minority representation. Moreover, controlling share-
holders can emasculate the cumulative voting right through such devices as
the classification of the board of directors through staggered terms, 195 the
reduction of the number of board members, the use of an executive commit-
tee with broad powers, or the amendment of the articles of incorporation or
bylaws. If cumulative voting is used, adequate protection should be included
in the articles of incorporation and bylaws to prevent a subsequent amend-
ment or termination of this right without the consent of the minority
shareholders.
4. Higher Quorum and Voting Requirements. Higher quorum and voting
requirements may effectively provide a minority shareholder with a veto
power at either the shareholder or board of directors level. The TBCA per-
mits the percentage required for shareholder or director approval to be in-
creased to the point of requiring unanimity.196 The TBCA also empowers a
corporation to increase the quorum requirement to 100% for either the
shareholders' or the board of directors' meeting. 197
Generally, increased voting requirements are sufficient to provide an effec-
tive veto. This veto power, however, increases the likelihood of deadlock
and thus makes even more important the need for suitable dispute resolution
procedures. 198 Consequently, a blanket increase of quorum or voting re-
quirements should be made with extreme caution. The wiser approach is to
use this technique selectively with respect to specific matters. 199
The minimum voting and quorum requirements for acts requiring a per-
194. 104 Pa. 150, 150-52 (1883).
195. Compare TBCA art. 2.33, § A (Vernon 1980) (permitting staggered terms to be pro-
vided for by the bylaws only if the board consists of nine or more directors) with DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (permitting staggering without any minimum number of directors).
196. See TBCA arts. 2.35 (Vernon 1980), 9.08 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1985).
197. TBCA arts. 2.28, 2.35 (Vernon 1980).
198. See Keating v. K-C-K Corp., 383 S.W.2d 69, 70-71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964,
no writ).
199. Professor Painter suggests the following checklist as areas in which to increase quo-
rum or voting requirements: (1) the corporation's making of major organic changes; (2) the
corporation's issuance of additional stock or sale of treasury stock; (3) the corporation's repur-
chase of outstanding stock; (4) the corporation's creation of new indebtedness; (5) the corpora-
tion's reduction of common stock dividends; (6) the corporation's reduction of salaries of
officers and major employees; (7) the corporation's firing of officers and major employees;
(8) the corporation's reduction in the number of directors; (9) the corporation's classification
of directors or staggering of directors' terms; (10) the corporation's articles of incorporation or
bylaws being amended; (11) the corporation's execution of contracts with corporations, part-
nerships, or other entities in which any shareholder has a substantial interest; and (12) the
corporation's consent to a petition in bankruptcy. W. PAINTER, supra note 4, § 3.6, at 66-67.
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centage vote of shareholders under the TBCA may be increased only by pro-
visions in the articles of incorporation. 200 With respect to other actions, the
minimum voting and quorum requirements for shareholders and the quorum
and voting requirements for the board of directors may be increased by
either the articles of incorporation or the bylaws. 20 1 If the bylaws is the sole
document that contains a provision regarding quorum and voting, one must
ensure that the bylaws can not be amended to defeat the purposes of the
higher voting or quorum requirements. The safest course is to include such
matters in the articles of incorporation and to repeat them in the bylaws.
5. Voting Trusts. A voting trust generally ensures that voting control will
remain in the hands of certain shareholders. Consequently, shareholders
frequently use a voting trust as an alternative to a shareholder pooling ar-
rangement. 20 2 The distinguishing characteristic of a voting trust is that it
creates a legal trust. A shareholder must irrevocably surrender legal title to
the shares to a trustee for the term of the trust. The shareholder, however,
remains the beneficial owner unless the trust agreement provides differ-
ently.20 3 Generally, the shareholders receive from the trustee certificates of
beneficial interest, which are freely transferable.
In Texas the voting trust is essentially a creature of statute. 2° 4 The TBCA
provides that any number of shareholders may create a voting trust for the
purpose of conferring upon a trustee the right to vote their shares. The vot-
ing trust, however, must meet the following statutory requirements: (1) the
term of the trust does not exceed ten years; (2) the trust agreement is in
writing; (3) the corporation has on file a counterpart of the trust agreement
at the corporation's registered office; and (4) the stock subject to the trust is
transferred to the trustee.20 5 Moreover, case law suggests an additional non-
statutory requirement that the trust exist for a proper purpose.
20 6
The trust instrument may restrict the voting powers of the trustee and
200. TBCA art. 2.28 (Vernon 1980).
201. TBCA arts. 2.28, 2.29 (Vernon 1980).
202. See infra notes 214-28 and accompanying text. 5 W. FLETCHER, supra note 62,
§ 2075 states:
A voting trust has been defined as a trust created by an agreement between a
group of the stockholders of a corporation and the trustee, or by a group of
identical agreements between individual stockholders and the common trustee,
whereby it is provided that for a term of years, or for a period contingent upon a
certain event, or until the agreement is terminated, control over the stock owned
by such stockholders, either for certain purposes or for all, shall be lodged in the
trustee, either with or without a reservation to the owners or persons designated
by them of the powers to direct how such control shall be used.
203. See Baldwin, Voting Trusts, I YALE L.J. 1, 2-4 (1891); Ballantine, Voting Trusts, Their
Abuses and Regulation, 21 TEX. L. REV. 139, 142 (1942); Wormser, The Legality of Corporate
Voting Trusts and Pooling Agreements, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 123, 123-24 (1918).
204. TBCA art. 2.30, § A (Vernon 1980).
205. TBCA art. 2.30, § A (Vernon 1980).
206. See Grynberg v. Burke, 378 A.2d 139, 144 (Del. Ch. 1977) (summary judgment de-
nied: fact issue existed concerning shareholders' agreement with stock purchase option), cross
motion for summary judgment granted, 410 A.2d 169 (Del. Ch. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Oceanic
Exploration Co. v. Grynberg, 428 A.2d 1 (Del. 1981); Grogan v. Grogan, 315 S.W.2d 34, 39
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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delineate the extent of the shareholder's beneficial interest. For example, the
trust instrument may prohibit the trustee from voting on fundamental cor-
porate matters without the consent of a specified percentage of the beneficial
owners. The trust agreement frequently specifies that dividends, which the
trustee collects, shall be distributed to the beneficial owners. 20 7 The TBCA
provides that the holder of a beneficial interest in a voting trust shall be
regarded as a holder of record of the shares and thus must inspect the record
of shareholders of the corporation. 20 8 Moreover, under the TBCA a benefi-
cial owner in a voting trust has standing to sue as plaintiff in a derivative
suit. 20
9
In the absence of statutory clarification to the contrary, the voting trust
agreement will most probably be subject to trust law in addition to the
TBCA.210 Consequently, the drafting attorney should carefully specify the
powers, duties, and bases for indemnification of the trustee in the trust agree-
ment.211 Unless the voting trust agreement expressly provides otherwise, the
trustee does not have to be a shareholder. The trustee may be a bank or
other institution, a neutral party, or one or more of the shareholders. If the
trustee is a shareholder or participates in the corporation as a director, of-
ficer, or employee, conflict of interest situations may arise.
The primary advantage of a voting trust over a shareholder pooling agree-
ment is that the voting trust avoids procedural problems related to voting
shares during a dispute between the shareholders. Except as limited by the
trust instrument, the voting rights vest in the trustee, who is under a fiduci-
ary duty to vote the stock in the manner set forth in the trust agreement.
Accordingly, the voting trust agreement should specify in detail how the
trustee must vote.
The primary disadvantages of the voting trust are the trust's formality, the
need to comply with statutory requirements, and the divestiture of the
stock's legal title. Moreover, shares of beneficial interest in a voting trust
may constitute securities, the transfer of which is subject to state and federal
securities laws. 212 Traditional problems under Subchapter S with respect to
voting trusts have been eliminated, however, and a voting trust is now con-
sidered to be a qualified shareholder.21 3
6. Shareholder Pooling Agreement. A shareholder may not legally sell
(separately from a sale of the actual shares) his vote or agree to vote the
shares in return for some personal benefit. 214 Shareholders may, however,
contract to vote their shares together for specified purposes in order to main-
207. See Note, The Voting Trust: Drafting Suggestions, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 349, 356
(1967).
208. TBCA art. 2.44, § F (Vernon 1980).
209. TBCA art. 5.14, § B(1) (Vernon 1980).
210. See A. ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 193 (3d ed. 1967 & Supp.).
211. Comment, Voting Trusts in Texas, 12 Sw. L.J. 85, 92-99 (1958).
212. See Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982) (current version); Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1982) (current version).
213. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(A)(iv) (1982).
214. Schreiber v. Carnery, 447 A.2d 17, 24-25 (Del. Ch. 1982); Clark, Vote Buying and
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tain control of a corporation. These voting agreements, though cannot seek
to govern how the directors actually vote or otherwise to impair the direc-
tors' discretion. 23 5 Unlike a voting trust, in which voting powers are di-
vorced from ownership, shareholders that agree to vote together retain all
incidents of ownership, except when the power to vote is contractually
pooled. 2 16
A question existed under Texas common law whether pooling agreements
were valid. Pooling agreements probably were valid if supported by proper
consideration. 217 Any doubt dissipated, however, with the enactment of an
express provision in the TBCA.2 1s The TBCA provides that shareholders
may enter into a voting agreement on any matter submitted to a vote at a
meeting of shareholders. 21 9
A shareholder pooling agreement must meet the following requirements:
(1) the agreement's term cannot exceed ten years; (2) the agreement is in
writing; (3) the corporation has on file a counterpart of the agreement at the
corporation's principal office and that agreement is subject to shareholder
examination; and (4) the stock certificates subject to a voting agreement con-
tain a statement that the stock is subject to such agreement. 220 Moreover, a
shareholder pooling agreement, like a voting trust, must have a proper pur-
pose.22 ' Arguably, the TBCA shareholder pooling agreement requirements
are not exclusive and an agreement that does not meet the TBCA's strict
requirements may nevertheless be valid. 222 The most prudent course, how-
ever, is to draft all shareholder pooling agreements to meet the TBCA statu-
tory requirements.
Certain major problems may exist with a shareholder pooling agreement.
First, because shareholders maintain legal title to and physical control over
stock subject to a pooling agreement, disagreements among the various con-
tracting parties are possible. Ideally, a pooling agreement will specify the
exact method of voting and the particular individual or the particular course
of action for which the shareholder is to vote. If a disagreement occurs,
however, a suitable mechanism for dispute resolution is important.22 3
Second, the TBCA provides that a shareholder pooling agreement is spe-
Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 776, 778 (1979); Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects
of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1429 (1964).
215. Burnett v. Word, Inc., 412 S.W.2d 792, 795 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967, no writ).
216. See Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely-Held Corporation, 59 YALE
L.J. 1040, 1040-41 (1950).
217. See Roberts v. Whitson, 188 S.W.2d 875, 877-78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1945, writ
ref'd w.o.m.).
218. TBCA art. 2.30, § B (Vernon 1980).
219. TBCA art. 2.30, § B (Vernon 1980).
220. TBCA art. 2.30, § B (Vernon 1980).
221. See Grogan v. Grogan, 315 S.W.2d 34, 39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1958, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
222. See Irwin v. Prestressed Structures, Inc., 420 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1967, writ ref d n.r.e.); see also Oceanic Exploration Co. v. Grynberg, 428 A.2d 1, 5
(Del. 1981) (upholding validity of agreement not in compliance with statutory provisions).
223. For example, ancillary provisions may be inserted into the agreement concerning arbi-
tration, voting for liquidation of the corporation, or granting an irrevocable proxy. See infra
text accompanying notes 253-79.
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cifically enforceable when a counterpart of the agreement is deposited with
the corporation and the prescribed statutory statement is endorsed upon the
stock certificates. 224 Delaware law, however, contains no provision permit-
ting specific performance. 225 Accordingly, if a Delaware corporation is in-
volved, a specific contractual provision should be contained in the agreement
granting the remedy of specific performance. 226
Third, when the subject of the pooling arrangement goes beyond the elec-
tion of directors, the question arises whether the additional subject matter is
the proper subject of a shareholder agreement. For example, the validity of
an agreement to pool votes with respect to employment of corporate officers,
authorization or approval of management contracts, or control over divi-
dend policies is questionable. Those subjects are within the authority of the
board of directors and any infringement upon the board's discretion is im-
proper and invalid. This argument's force diminishes, however, when the
agreement is between all the corporation's shareholders. 227
Fourth, although mutual promises should be sufficient consideration in a
shareholders' agreement, prudence mandates the recitation of additional
consideration whenever possible. Finally, since the shareholder's agreement
should contain a provision restricting the parties' transfer of stock, the stock
certificates are subject to the TBCA conspicuous notice requirement. 228
7. Shareholder Arrangements and the TCCL. Shareholders in a close cor-
poration can use any or all of the control devices noted above since none of
the devices are inconsistent with the TCCL. 229 There are four additional
alternatives that may benefit the allocation of control within a close corpora-
tion. 230 First, the shareholder's agreement may name the persons who will
serve as directors for the duration of the agreement and thereby avoid the
need for annual elections.2 3 1 Second, the shareholders' agreement may au-
thorize pooling and voting trust arrangements that are not limited by the
224. TBCA art. 2.30, § B (Vernon 1980).
225. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218 (1983).
226. For an example illustrating the difficulties that can arise in the enforcement of a share-
holder pooling agreement under Delaware law, see Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum &
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 29 Del. Ch. 318, 49 A.2d 603, 611 (1946), modified, 29 Del. Ch.
610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
227. To prevent the subject matter of the shareholder agreement from being outside the
realm of shareholder competence, all the shareholders should sign the agreement and the arti-
cles of incorporation should include specific veto provisions. Incorporating an express sever-
ability clause in the pooling agreement is also advisable. See Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 98-
105, 405 N.E.2d 681, 684-86, 428 N.Y.S.2d 199, 202-05 (1980) (upholding a unanimous share-
holders' agreement that required consent of minority shareholders before certain business ac-
tivities could be transacted by the corporation, even though agreement did not strictly comply
with Delaware law); Annot., 15 A.L.R.4th 1078, 1078-1100 (1982). Moreover, if the subject
matter of the agreement goes beyond the election of directors, having the corporation sign the
agreement is prudent. In all cases the agreement should clearly state that the agreement is
binding on the shareholders' heirs, representatives, successors, and assigns.
228. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
229. TCCL art. 12.03, § B (Vernon Supp. 1985).




TBCA.232 Third, the agreement may require super majorities or unanimity
and bind the parties even if not mentioned in the articles of incorporation. 233
Finally, the shareholders' agreement may provide that each shareholder
shall have only one vote rather than one vote for every share of stock.234
8. Management Contracts. Shareholders in a closely-held corporation
often participate actively in the corporation's day-to-day operations. These
working shareholders may rely on salary distributions to reap their eco-
nomic benefits from the corporation. The use of management contracts can
ensure a predictable income stream for the minority shareholder/employee.
In addition, for the more mature close corporation, members of management
may not be significant shareholders. Such persons, however, have expecta-
tions to preserve that benefit for both such managers and the corporate
owners.
a. Statutory Provisions. For many years Texas courts viewed long-term
employment contracts with disfavor, especially when the contracts provided
employment for corporate officers. The courts considered employment con-
tracts to be against public policy and unenforceable as infringements upon
the prerogatives of future boards of directors.235 The TBCA currently pro-
vides, however, that a corporation can enter into management contracts with
the corporation's officers and agents.236
b. Authority to Employ. The TBCA provides that the board of directors
shall elect the corporation's president, vice-president, secretary, and treas-
urer. 237 The TBCA appears to provide a statutory basis for the board of
directors to delegate this power to an executive or other committee if the
articles of incorporation or bylaws so provide.238 Only the board of direc-
tors, however, has the power to employ the president, vice-president, secre-
tary, and treasurer.2 39 Thus, the board apparently cannot subsequently
ratify the exercise of this authority by someone other than the full board of
directors.240 The ministerial acts of negotiating and executing the employ-
ment contract may, however, be delegated to an officer of the corporation.
c. Bylaw Limitations. A problem can arise if the corporation's bylaws
provide that officers are to be elected to one-year terms. Such a bylaw provi-
232. Id. Voting commitments or delegations of voting power can therefore exist for a term
longer than ten years and need not be filed with the corporation.
233. Id. The agreement can also specify how voting power will be exercised or divided
either in general or specific matters.
234. Id. at F-15.
235. See Denton Milling Co. v. Blewett, 254 S.W. 236, 238-39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana), writ ref'd per curiam, 114 Tex. 581, 278 S.W. 1114 (1923).
236. TBCA art. 2.02, § A(12) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
237. TBCA art. 2.42, § A (Vernon Supp. 1985).
238. See TBCA art. 2.36 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
239. See TBCA art. 2.42, § A (Vernon Supp. 1985).




sion is generally considered to restrict the board of directors' power to enter
into an employment contract with an officer for a term in excess of one
year. 24' The TBCA, however, vests power to amend or repeal corporate by-
laws in the board of directors unless the articles of incorporation specifically
reserve this power to the shareholders. 242 The board of directors thus may
amend a restrictive bylaw provision that limits the term of office to one year.
If the articles of incorporation reserve the power to amend the bylaws to the
shareholders, however, the board of directors remains restricted by the by-
law provision. If the closely-held corporation desires to use management
contracts, the best course is to make adequate provisions in the bylaws at the
time of incorporation.
d. Specific Term. Under Texas law an employee generally may termi-
nate an employment contract at any time, though he still might be subject to
noncompetition or trade secret disclosure covenants. If the corporation pre-
maturely terminates the contract, the discharged employee retains any con-
tract rights he has under the agreement. 243 Thus, drafting the agreement to
specify clearly the grounds on which the corporation may discharge an em-
ployee is important.
e. Restrictive Covenants. Often management will attempt to protect the
corporation from vindictive action by a shareholder/employee by including
restrictive covenants, such as noncompetition and confidentiality clauses in
the employment contract. Texas courts have generally upheld covenants not
to compete. In Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell244 the Texas Supreme
Court held that covenants not to compete are enforceable if the terms are
reasonable even though the covenants are in restraint of trade.245 Thus, if
the noncompetition agreement is ancillary to and in support of the employ-
ment contract and is not an unreasonable restraint of trade, courts will en-
force the noncompetition agreement. 246
The two primary factors that courts consider to determine whether a re-
strictive covenant is reasonable are: (1) the duration of the restriction; and
(2) the territory that the restriction encompasses. 247 The courts will, how-
ever, consider other factors, such as hardship on the employee, the em-
241. See Pioneer Specialties, Inc. v. Nelson, 339 S.W.2d 199, 200-01 (Tex. 1960); Dixie
Glass Co. v. Pollak, 341 S.W.2d 530, 535-36 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1960), writ ref'd n.r.e.,
347 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. 1961).
242. TBCA art. 2.23 (Vernon 1980).
243. TBCA art. 2.43 (Vernon 1980) provides:
Any officer or agent or member of a committee elected or appointed by the
board of directors may be removed by the board of directors whenever in its
judgment the best interests of the corporation will be served thereby, but such
removal shall be without prejudice to the contract rights, if any, of the person so
removed.
244. 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950 (1960).
245. Id. at 312, 340 S.W.2d at 951.
246. Frankiewicz v. National Comp Assocs., 633 S.W.2d 505, 507-08 (Tex. 1982); Justin
Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex. 1973).
247. Weatherford Oil Tool, 161 Tex. at 311-13, 340 S.W.2d at 951.
19851
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ployee's skill, and the employee's dealings with the employer's customers.
The court determines the reasonableness of a restriction since the question is
one of law.24 8 Rather than void an agreement that is unenforceable upon its
terms, however, a court will enforce the agreement in a manner that is rea-
sonable under the circumstances.
249
Under well-settled Texas law, the unauthorized use of confidential infor-
mation and trade secrets may be enjoined on the basis of either contract or
tort law.2 50 When drafting a provision prohibiting the use of trade secrets or
other confidential information, the draftsman should specify what informa-
tion is considered confidential and that the employee has a fiduciary relation-
ship with the employer. Restrictions may not be imposed, however, with
respect to matters of general knowledge or matters that do not directly relate
to the competitive position of the corporation.
25 1
f Protection of the Employee. The management contract is frequently
used to protect a minority shareholder/employee from majority oppression.
In such instances the draftsman must consider contractual provisions relat-
ing to the basis for discharge, the basis and payment of compensation, the
term of employment, and the means of enforcing the contract. A cautious
counsel will often incorporate a management contract into a shareholder
agreement so that the management contract binds both the corporation and
all the shareholders. Counsel should also consider articles of incorporation
or bylaw provisions that create a veto power for the shareholder/employee
in matters involving a material change in employment terms, conditions of
discharge, or amendments to the articles and bylaws concerning such
matters.
252
VI. EFFECTIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Effective dispute resolution procedures are of great concern in the closely-
held corporation. In the closely-held corporation personal and business rela-
tionships often exist among the owners, and a close identification exists be-
tween the owners and managers. The closely-held corporation is analogous,
in many respects, to an extended family. When harmony prevails, the unit is
a most productive and supportive structure. When dissension develops,
however, the analogy shifts to that of a bitter divorce. 2 53 From the use of
248. Chenault v. Otis Eng'g Corp., 423 S.W.2d 377, 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
249. Lewis v. Krueger, Hutchinson & Overton Clinic, 153 Tex. 363, 364, 269 S.W.2d 798,
799 (1954). For further discussion, see 8 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE ch. 201
(1985).
250. Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 577-79, 591-92, 314 S.W.2d 763, 770-71, 780-81
(1958).
251. Furr's, Inc. v. United Specialty Advertising Co., 338 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1960, writ refd n.r.e.).
252. See STATE BAR OF TEXAS, Long-Term Employment Contracts, in INCORPORATION
PLANNING IN TEXAS 47 (1973); Kessler, Employment Arrangements in Close Corporations, 1
SETON HALL L. REV. 187, 189-90 (1980).
253. See Howe, Corporate Divorce: Deadlocks in the Close Corporation, 22 Bus. LAW. 469,
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the various control devices discussed above, one can readily see that the
seeds of dissension exist in the closely-held corporation. Unlike a partner-
ship, which the partners can readily dissolve at any time, a corporation may
not be so easily terminated. Moreover, even if the shareholders can dissolve
the corporation, dissolution may not be in the best interest of all parties
concerned. 254
A. Bases of Dispute
Disputes within the closely-held corporation may arise for a variety of
reasons, including: (1) the active involvement of shareholders in corporate
management; (2) the breakdown of personal relationships between share-
holders; (3) family difficulties; (4) deadlock among the shareholders, particu-
larly when veto powers have been given through the articles of
incorporation, bylaws, or ancillary agreements; (5) deadlock on the board of
directors; (6) problems concerning buy-out arrangements; and (8) problems
concerning whether to dissolve. The disputes themselves break down to
either irreconcilable matters heading to litigation, appraisal/valuation mat-
ters, or arguments over managerial policies.
B. Contractual and Charter Solutions
1. Standby Trust or Irrevocable Proxy. A standby trust is essentially a vot-
ing trust, operative only in the event of deadlock, in which the trustee votes
for dissolution or in another manner designed to resolve the dispute. This
trust is subject to the same restrictions concerning voting trusts as previously
discussed. 255 As a substitute for a standby trust, shareholders may agree in a
shareholders' agreement to grant an irrevocable proxy in the event of a
deadlock.2 56
2. Buy-Sell Arrangements. Buy-sell arrangements often favor shareholders
with readily available cash, and the mechanics of such an agreement can
often be unwieldy.257 Moreover, buy-sell arrangements can give rise to fur-
469 (1967); Pachman, Divorce Corporate Style: Possession, Oppression and Commercial Moral-
ity, 10 SETON HALL L. REV. 315, 318 (1979). One commentator mused:
As a rough generalization, a closed corporation is one in which all the stock-
holders know each other by sight and, more often than not, are related by blood
or marriage. It is notorious that no feuds are so venomous as those within fami-
lies, and a closed corporation is often a Petri dish for the cultivation of every
known strain of human vindictiveness, greed and chicanery. It has been said
that God made the country, man made the city and the Devil made the small
town. God has little to do with the creation of corporations, public or closed,
but the Devil certainly seems to take an interest in the workings of family
corporations.
Bishop, Book Review, 1976 DUKE L.J. 155, 158.
254. See Field, Resolving Shareholder Disputes and Breaking Deadlocks in the Closed Cor-
poration, 58 MINN. L. REV. 985, 993 (1974).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 202-13.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 181-89.
257. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
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ther disputes. Thus, providing for arbitration, dissolution, or another dis-
pute settlement mechanism in these agreements is important.
3. Contractual Appraisal Provisions. If a dispute concerns the valuation of
the corporation, an independent appraisal procedure may be desirable.
4. Special Class of Stock. If the corporation is a party to the shareholder
agreement, the draftsman can provide for the corporation to issue a special
class of stock in the event of a deadlock. The corporation issues this stock to
a specified neutral party. The stock contains voting rights and the right to
call a special shareholders' meeting, but only for so long as the deadlock
continues. The corporation then redeems the stock following resolution of
the deadlock. This special class of stock only has the privilege of voting in a
deadlock situation, although the stock upon redemption has a liquidation
preference. 258
5. Special Dissolution Provisions. The drafter can write contractual provi-
sions that set forth the right and conditions for dissolution of the corpora-
tion. These provisions can be included in either the articles of incorporation
or a shareholders' agreement executed by all shareholders and preferably
also by the corporation. If desired, a closely-held corporation can contract
to have dissolution procedures similar to the procedures of a partnership.
259
6. Limited Corporate Life. Although most corporations today specify a
perpetual existence, the drafter can provide in the articles of incorporation
for a limited duration, which can be subsequently amended if desired. If the
limited duration is used, a provision in the articles of incorporation concern-
ing veto power over the amendment of the articles on this matter may be
desirable.
C. Arbitration
The Texas General Arbitration Act2 6 ° permits parties to enter into an
agreement to arbitrate future controversies. Arbitration agreements, in-
serted into shareholders' agreements, buy-sell agreements, or bylaws, are
often proposed as an efficient, informal, and less expensive way of resolving
corporate disputes. Arbitration, however, is not always the most efficient
and expeditious means to resolve conflicts. Although litigation is expensive,
the courtroom consistently provides an effective forum for clarifying issues
and bringing a final resolution to the disputed matter. Depending upon the
quality and intelligence of the arbitrator and the efficiency and effectiveness
258. See Capital Nat'l Bank v. S.E. Realty Corp., 515 S.W.2d 330, 331 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
259. See Texas Uniform Partnership Act § 30, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 61326
(Vernon Supp. 1985).
260. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 224-49 (Vernon 1973 & Supp. 1985); see Car-
rington, The 1965 General Arbitration Statute of Texas, 20 Sw. L.J. 21 (1966); Comment, 1979
Amendment to the General Arbitration Act: Will It Allow Arbitration to Become a Viable Tool
for Settling Disputes?, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 314, 315 (1980).
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of the contracted settlement mechanism, arbitration may in fact be less desir-
able than straightforward litigation.
A practitioner should consider the following guidelines in drafting an ar-
bitration agreement. First, the agreement should comply with the Texas Ar-
bitration Act.2 6 1 Second, the agreement should delineate the types of
controversies that the agreement covers. Third, the agreement should spec-
ify the requisite qualifications of arbitrators and how an arbitrator will be
selected. Fourth, both judicial and nonjudicial standards to be employed by
the arbitrators should be indicated within the agreement. Fifth, the agree-
ment should specify the procedures that the arbitrators will use when con-
ducting the arbitration. Sixth, the agreement should clarify whether any
preconditions to arbitration exist and whether arbitration is the exclusive
remedy available to the parties. Seventh, the agreement should provide for
the finality and enforcement of the arbitral decision. Finally, the agreement
should specify how the cost of the arbitration proceeding is to be allocated.
Arbitration has several limitations. First, arbitration is an intrusion into
the traditional management decision-making processes and may substitute
for decisions that the board of directors should make. Arbitration also may
bypass the fiduciary duties that should exist between the various actors in
the closely-held corporation. Moreover, court suits can evade the arbitra-
tion mechanism if the arbitration provision is not properly structured or if
the matter is deemed not to be subject to arbitration.2 62
D. Statutory Receivership and Dissolution
Dissolution is the most drastic and often the least desirable method of
resolving disputes within the closely-held corporation. 2 63 TBCA article 7.05
is the primary statutory provision concerning a deadlocked corporation. 264
The article provides that a shareholder may bring an action for the appoint-
ment of a rehabilitative receiver if he can show either that: (1) the corpora-
tion may suffer irreparable damage because of a deadlock among the
directors that the shareholders are unable to break; 265 or (2) the sharehold-
ers are deadlocked and have consequently failed for the past two years to
elect successors to those directors whose terms have expired.2 66
If the court-appointed receiver's rehabilitative efforts are not successful,
the court may direct liquidation of the corporation if no feasible plan for
remedying the corporation's condition is presented within twelve months af-
ter the receiver's appointment. 26 7 Thus, dissolution may ultimately occur,
261. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 224 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
262. See Note, Mandatory Arbitration as a Remedy for Intra-Close Corporate Disputes, 56
VA. L. REV. 271, 279-86 (1980).
263. See Heatherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solu-
tion to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 1-6 (1977); Hillman, The
Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Perma-
nence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982).
264. TBCA art. 7.05 (Vernon 1980).
265. TBCA art. 7.05, § A(1)(b) (Vernon 1980).
266. TBCA art. 7.05, § A(1)(e) (Vernon 1980).
267. TBCA art. 7.06, § A(3) (Vernon 1980).
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although the procedure may be rather lengthy. Even if rehabilitation, but
not dissolution, is desired, the appointment of a receiver introduces an in-
dependent third party as the controller of the corporation's affairs. Much
depends upon whom the judge appoints as receiver. The appointed receiver
may or may not be astute in business and financial affairs. As a practical
observation, I would be extremely hesitant to invoke the rehabilitative provi-
sions of the TBCA unless ultimate dissolution is inevitable or desired.
If a minority shareholder wants the court to appoint a receiver for rehabil-
itative purposes, the minority shareholder must show either that: (1) the
corporation is in danger of insolvency; 268 (2) the directors or officers have
acted illegally, oppressively, or fraudulently; 269 or (3) the directors or of-
ficers are wasting the corporation's assets.270 Additionally, the minority
shareholder must show that all other available remedies, including appoint-
ment of a receiver for specific corporate assets, are inadequate. 27 1 Such a
showing may be extremely difficult to make. Neither mere shareholder dis-
satisfaction with corporate management2 72 nor a need to conserve specific
corporate assets273 is a sufficient ground for statutory receivership.
E. Approach Under the TCCL
The TCCL contains express provisions dealing with dispute resolution. 274
The TCCL authorizes either the close corporation or a shareholder to seek
judicial resolution of shareholder disputes. 27 5 TCCL article 12.51 reflects
the Texas legislature's recognition of the need for greater flexibility in resolv-
ing disputes within a close corporation. Article 12.51 provides that the party
seeking judicial resolution of a corporate dispute may, in addition to filing
suit for judicial resolution according to the provisions available to an ordi-
nary corporation under the TBCA, initiate a proceeding to enforce a close
corporation provision, appoint a provisional director, or appoint a custo-
dian.276 Article 12.51 further provides that the TCCL dispute resolution
mechanisms are not exclusive, but supplement any other shareholder reme-
dies that the TBCA or law allows. 277 The shareholder who seeks to initiate
a judicial proceeding to resolve a corporate dispute, however, may not in-
voke the TCCL dispute resolution provisions until all nonjudicial remedies
provided for in the shareholder agreement have been exhausted unless he
can prove that the corporation, the shareholders as a whole, or the share-
268. TBCA art. 7.05, § A(l)(a) (Vernon 1980).
269. TBCA art. 7.05, § A(1)(c) (Vernon 1980).
270. TBCA art. 7.05, § A(1)(d) (Vernon 1980). The statutory provisions must be strictly
followed. See Aubin v. Territorial Mortgage Co. of Am., Inc., 640 S.W.2d 737, 741-42 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
271. TBCA art. 7.05, § A (Vernon 1980).
272. Texarkana College Bowl, Inc. v. Phillips, 408 S.W.2d 537, 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1966, no writ).
273. Humble Exploration Co. v. Fairway Land Co., 641 S.W.2d 934, 939 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
274. TCCL arts. 12.51-.54 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
275. TCCL art. 12.51, § B (Vernon Supp. 1985).
276. TCCL art. 12.51, § B (Vernon Supp. 1985).
277. TCCL art. 12.51, § D (Vernon Supp. 1985).
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holder himself will suffer irreparable injury before the nonjudicial remedies
are exhausted. 278 Thus, if the shareholder agreement provides for any non-
judicial remedies, such as arbitration, the complaining shareholder must
either pursue the remedies prescribed in the agreement or prove that judicial
intervention is justified under the circumstances. This additional hurdle of
exhaustion of extrajudicial remedies is yet another reason that counsel re-
sponsible for drafting the incorporation documents and shareholder agree-
ment should ensure that the shareholders prefer nonjudicial remedies as a
first alternative to the judicial remedies granted close corporations by the
TCCL.2 79 Counsel, of course, bears the burden of informing the incorporat-
ing shareholders during the planning stages of their alternatives with respect
to dispute resolution and should outline for the shareholders the practical
effects of each alternative.
VII. CONCLUSION
Properly structuring the governance of the closely-held corporation is a
most challenging and rewarding experience for the corporate lawyer. Unlike
the large, publicly-held corporation, the close corporation has the dynamic
elements of human personality and relations, replete with all the idiosyncra-
sies that these attend, infused within every phase of the corporation's exist-
ence and operation. The TCCL provides additional flexibility over the broad
framework of the TBCA and accommodates the informal and personal char-
acteristics of the close corporation. Thus, the corporate lawyer is well-
equipped under the Texas corporation statutes both to meet the legal needs
of the individual business and to structure the corporation in accordance
with the business arrangements of the owners and managers.
I have attempted to provide a guide to understanding how the closely-held
corporation operates within the peaceful coexistence of the TBCA and the
TCCL. More importantly, I have endeavored to create a guide to planning
and creating the close corporation and to anticipate the legal and personal
pitfalls inherent in the beast. In all events, counsel responsible for planning
and incorporating the close corporation should first resort to the basic char-
ter documents to accommodate the specific needs of the business within the
structure and protections afforded by the TBCA and TCCL. By paying
close attention to these statutes and balancing anticipation with simplicity,
the corporate lawyer can often meet the desires of the incorporators without
resorting to more complicated, more expensive, and more legally treacher-
ous ancillary contractual arrangements.
278. TCCL art. 12.51, § E (Vernon Supp. 1985).
279. See supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the positive and
negative aspects of arbitration.
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